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The Island Compared. The traditional single focus on Cuba tends to portray the
topic of analysis as exceptional and exclusive to the island. A comparative
approach to Cuban studies highlights both similarities and differences with other
cases.
Revisiting the Republic. Studies of Cuba have been marked by and have revolved
around the Cuban Revolution. As a consequence, the Cuban Republic in its
political, social and cultural dimensions has been understudied.
Power and Resistance - Narratives and Counternarratives. How have power and resistance been manifested in the Cuban context over time?
Cultural Unity. Do Cubans share a common culture? Have Cubans and CubanAmericans developed divergent cultures? This theme brings together issues of
culture, nation, diaspora and transnationalism.
For more information, contact:
Cuban Research Institute
Florida International University

University Park, DM 363, Miami, Florida 33199
Voice: (305) 348-1991, Fax: (305) 348-3593
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n this issue we are pleased to provide thoughtful analysis of the role and contribution of
Latin American immigrants to the United States. We begin with Jorge Ramos' commentary
on the "rediscovery" of Latinos in the US. The well-known anchor of Univisi6n's nightly
newscast concludes that "white Americans refuse to accept that the US stopped being a predominantly Anglo country a long time ago." The subsequent articles reveal the growing significance of Latinos in both economics and politics.
The picture that emerges of Latinos in the US is complex and diverse. Sarah Mahler's essay on
Salvadorans, for example, analyzes the experiences of a recent wave of immigrants to this country.
While Salvadorans may not yet be as visible as other Latino immigrant groups, Mahler points out
that they may well surpass Cubans numerically in the next census. Her article is complemented by
Manuel Orozco's research on Central American immigrants in general. Orozco discusses the commonalities and differences among these groups and concludes that fears that immigrants from
these countries will lead inexorably to the "thirdworldization" of the United States are misplaced.
Manny Hidalgo and Uva de Arag6n provide interesting glimpses of the changing nature of Cuban
Miami and of Cuba itself. Both authors conclude that the younger generation of Cubans and
Cuban-Americans represents new hope for dialogue and rapprochement between the two communities.
Finally, Janet Jarman's photo essay presents a magnificent portrait of the trail of a Mexican family
from the border to their new life in the United States.
A special report section analyzes the Summit of the Americas process, which began in Miami in
1994 and brought together the heads of state of 34 countries of the region in Santiago, Chile this
past April. We are especially pleased to publish a translation of Hdio Jaguaribe's critique of the
region's general movement towards a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). Jaguaribe argues
that for the Mercosur countries, entry into an FTAA will constitute an act of historical suicide.
Peter McKenna discusses Canada's new role in the Americas, noting that it has already become a
major regional actor. Emilio Pantojas-Garcia's "Islands Apart" reminds us that the Caribbean is also
an important but neglected player in the unfolding FTAA. Bill Smith adopts a more theoretical
approach that analyzes the implications of the Summit accords for combating poverty and inequality in the Americas.
We were delighted to read the many messages and letters sent to Hemisphere regardingour issues
on sustainable development (volume 8 number 1) and neoliberalism (volume 8 number 2). The
editors are pleased by both the congratulatory and the critical responses received, as they indicate
to us that Hemisphere is being read in many places and by a wide variety of audiences. Generating
debate on the issues that affect the Americas is our central objective. We hope that this issue is in
keeping with this goal.

Eduardo A. Gamarra
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The Rediscovery of Latinos
Jorge Ramos Avalos

C

last. The network
reported the
recently
NN has discovered
us at
extraordinary growth of
the Spanish-language
media in the US, a phenomenon that is not new but which
CNN-along with millions of North
Americans-has only just noticed.
The tone of the report was one of
amazement: CNN as a modern-day
Columbus.
This is but one example of the
ongoing cycle of alternating interest
and neglect which shapes attitudes
towards Latinos in this country. But
there are more and more Latinos in
the US, and wherever you look, their
presence is making itself felt. For a
number of reasons-political and
economic power, as well as sheer
numbers-they are not so easy to
overlook anymore.
THE LARGEST MINORITY

According to official census figures,
there are more than 30 million
Latinos in the US, representing more
than 10% of the total population.
However, the true figure is almost
certainly higher, since official surveys
do not include illegal immigrants.
Moreover, the Latino population is
growing at faster rate than other ethnic groups; on average, Latinos have
more children than US whites or
African-Americans. The National
Center for Health Statistics reports
that in 1995, Latinos accounted for
18% of all births in the US.
In addition, the 1997 joint USMexican Binational Study of

Jorge Ramos Avalos is a journalist and
co-anchorof Univision's nightly newscast.
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Migration concluded that approximately 105,000 undocumented
Mexicans enter the US every year.
These immigrants lack permission to
work legally in this country, but work
they do-and lots of it. The flow cannot be halted with laws or 10-foot
high walls along the border. Illegal
immigration is a problem of supply
and demand; as long as there are
excess workers in Latin America and
available jobs in the US, people will
find a way to cross the frontier.
By the year 2010, Latinos are
expected to be the country's biggest
minority group. There is strength in
numbers, and this demographic
importance is behind the still limited
political power of Latinos in the US.
MIAMI AS PROTOTYPE

If all Latinos voted as faithfully as
do Cuban-Americans in South
Florida, the history of Latinos in this
country would be quite different.
Cuban-Americans represent more
than half of the population of MiamiDade County, and at election time
they turn out in force. That's why
South Florida's top political posts are
held by Latinos, and Latino concerns
are a high priority for all candidates,
regardless of their race or ethnic origin. The political might of CubanAmericans is felt as far away as
Washington, D.C., and plays an
important role in shaping US policy
toward Cuba.
Miami is the best example of what
could and should happen in other
cities where Latinos are poised to
become a majority. Almost 40% of
the population of Los Angeles, for
example, is Latino. For the city government to be truly representative,
four out of every 10 municipal officials should be Latino; for that mat-

ter, so should the mayor. But for a
variety of reasons, both historical and
immigration-related, the MexicanAmerican community has yet to
reach the level of political mobilization achieved by Cuban-Americans.
Part of the problem is that MexicanAmericans have traditionally resisted
the idea of becoming US citizens.
This is beginning to change, thanks
to a new Mexican law allowing dual
citizenship. The fear that the US will
deny certain benefits and social services to legal residents has also contributed to produce record numbers
of applications for American citizenship.
For the time being, however, the
Latino residents of San Antonio,
Chicago, New York, San Francisco
and other cities still have a long way
to go before they attain the political
power of Miami's Cuban-Americans.
Why be more like Miami? For one
thing, it is the only city in this country that treats Latinos like first-class
citizens. In schools, restaurants, government offices and movie theaters,
Latinos receive equal treatment.
(Please note that residents of other
cities are urged not to emulate
Miami's corruption scandals and
electoral frauds).
The success that Latinos have
achieved in Miami has yet to be
repeated at the national level. If
Latinos make up 10% of the US population, then they should occupy a
proportional number of Senate seats.
At present, however, there is not a
single senator with the last name
Perez, Suirez or Rodriguez.

MONEY TALKS
Latino demographic growth has
had a more direct impact when it
comes to the economy. Like an ad
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America's fastest-growing minority still comes as a surprise

for a used-car dealership or mattress
emporium, the US has made it very
clear that "what counts here is cash!"
The most listened-to radio stations
in Los Angeles broadcast in Spanish,
much to the chagrin of their Englishlanguage competitors. And for the
evening news, most Angelinos tune in
to one of several choices in Spanish.
It goes without saying that the
Spanish-language media dominate
the market in Miami. So why is
English-language ad space still more
expensive?
Unfortunately, big audiences don't
necessarily mean big income. Many
US companies are still reluctant to
invest in Spanish-language advertising, although there has been significant progress in this area. According
to the New York Times, in 1997 AT&T
invested $1.4 billion in ads that targeted Latinos, a 14% increase over
the company's spending the year
before. Other companies are following suit.

Latinos don't just determine what
gets shown on television in many
major cities in this country; they also
have a strong influence over the type
of merchandise that is sold in stores.
Already more tortillas are sold in the
US than bagels, and more salsa than
ketchup. Big stores like Sears have
found it necessary to adapt to Latino
tastes and styles, which means more
black brassieres and fewer pairs of
checkered pants.
All of this can be attributed not
only to a Latino cultural invasion, but
to growing consumer buying power
on the part of Latino shoppers. A
recent University of Southern
California study found that the average annual income of Latino males
increased from $14,900 to $18,900 in
the last 10 years. The same study concluded that immigrants in California
are learning English and escaping
poverty at an unprecedented rate.
Latin American immigrants make
an enormous contribution to the US

economy. In the most extensive study
to date, the National Academy of
Sciences estimated that immigrants to
this country-mostly Latinoscontribute $10 billion a year to the
nation's economy. In other words,
immigrants are big business. Entire
sectors of the economy, such as the
textile, agricultural and service industries-including restaurants, hotels
and cleaning services-depend on
Latino workers, especially illegal ones.
In addition, thousands of US families
leave their children in the hands of
immigrant nannies and day-care
workers. All of this adds up to a level
of Latino influence that would have
seemed incredible only a few years
ago.
IDENTTY CISIS

The discovery and rediscovery of
Latinos will continue indefinitely in
this country, especially in those areas
without a strong Latino presence.
But as Latinos continue to grow in
numbers and political clout, it won't
be necessary for CNN to let the world
know that we're here and we count.
To reach this level of acceptance
will be an uphill battle, full of roadblocks and obstacles. The antiimmigrant and anti-Latino sentiment
in this country-manifest in all its
racial bigotry in California's
Propositions 187 and 209-is still running strong. The US is in the midst
of an identity crisis; it doesn't dare
look in the mirror to see its own mul-

Mexican-American participants in a Cinco de Mayo parade in Santa Barbara,
California flaunt their dual identity.

tiracial and multicultural reflection.
Many white Americans refuse to
accept that the US stopped being a
predominantly Anglo country a long
time ago. That's why Latinos are constantly being rediscovered, and why
the rest of the country is always so
surprised to see us. U
Hemisphere
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Winds of Change
Uva de Arag6n

ith the fall of the
Berlin War and
the collapse of the
Soviet Empire in
the late 1980s,
Cuban-Americans
began to speak enthusiastically about
a post-Castro era. Many in the community expected that the Cuban
regime would soon succumb to the
same pressures that had defeated
communism in most of Europe. Few
imagined that a different series of
events would play a potentially more
decisive role in shaping the island's
future.
Pope John Paul II's visit to Cuba
last January spawned a major polemic
in Miami, the US city with the highest
concentration of Cuban-Americans.
On the one hand, those opposed to
the visit argued that the pope's presence would legitimate the Castro
regime, thereby prolonging the suffering of the Cuban people. These
critics vehemently objected to plans
by some Cuban exiles to travel to the
island; ultimately, the pressure they
generated was so strong that Miami
Archbishop Clemente Favarola was
forced to cancel a cruise he had
reserved for hundreds of the faithful.
For supporters, on the other hand,
the pope's visit marked a crucial turning point. People who otherwise
would never have thought of returning to Cuba under the current regime
felt a desire to join the pope in prayer
in the country of their birth. If the
pope is willing and humble enough
to hold a dialogue with Castro, they
reasoned, if he is capable of separat-

Uva de Aragon is assistant director of
the Cuban Research Institute at Florida
International University.
6
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ing the government from the people,
shouldn't we do the same? Many who
made the trip describe it as an experience that changed their lives.
The visit also had a powerful
impact on those who stayed at home,
their eyes glued to the television
screen. The spectacle of thousands of
Cubans attending Mass across the
island, singing religious songs and
applauding the pope's homilies-so
different from the official government slogans-and, above all, the
shouts of "Libertad!Libertad! Libertad!"
made Cubans on this side of the Gulf
feel they were witnessing a miracle.
Many of those who didn't make the
trip regretted their decision. In a surprising turnaround, several leading
critics of the cruise publicly apologized for their mistake.
The pope's visit was magical in yet
another way: It brought different
generations together. Grandmothers
who had taught their children to pray
to the Virgen de la Caridad,parents
who never let go of their nostalgia for
the old country, teenagers trying to
come to terms with their own identity-all joined in a tearful embrace.
The miracles of faith and technology
allowed them to share a transcendent
moment with their countrymen in
Cuba.
The months have passed, and on
the surface things haven't changed
much either in Cuba or in the exile
community. The pope's visit and the
magic it generated have begun to
seem parenthetical. If we look deeper into Cuban and Cuban-American
society, however, certain changes are
apparent.
Any analysis of these changes must
take into account the unfortunate
tendency, both in this country and
elsewhere. to view the Cuban-

American community as a homogenous bloc. The common stereotype is
of a group of rabidly anti-communist,
conservative Republicans who support violent methods and harsh legislation such as the Helms-Burton Act
to overthrow the Cuban government.
This description fits a vocal portion of
the community, the so-called "hardliners." And yet, a substantial percentage of Cuban-Americans disagrees
with these goals, favoring instead a
peaceful transition characterized by
gradual change, reconciliation, cultural and academic exchange, and
bridges between the island and exile
communities. In both communities-for the exile community is, in
reality, a reflection of Cuba-the official discourse often contrasts with
deeper popular undercurrents. Proof
of this statement lies in the fact that
the first to violate if not the letter,
then the spirit of the US embargo
against Cuba are those CubanAmericans who visit or send hard currency to their families back home.
Both family visits and remittances are
relatively recent phenomena, but the
ideological differences they reveal
have long characterized the exile
community.
The post-papal era is part of an
ongoing process of change, whose origins can be traced as far back as 1978.
That was the year that the Castro government convoked a "representative"
group of exiles for a dialogue that
resulted in the release of a number of
political prisoners, some of whom had
been in jail for the past 20 years. The
regime also agreed to allow the
return of the gusanos-or"worms," a
pejorative way of referring to Cuban
exiles-now metamorphosed into
"butterflies," who were invited to visit
bearing gifts and photos of their

Commentary

Cuban-Americans in the post-papal era

houses, cars and other fruits of the
American Dream. These concessions
poked the first holes in the carefully
constructed wall designed to separate
Cubans from their diaspora. Since
then, an invisible web has linked
Cubans on both sides of the Straits of
Florida, enabling dialogue at the
humanitarian level.
The more than 100,000 marielitos
who arrived on US shores in 1980
made an additional impact on CubanAmerican relations. The Mariel
boatlift forced the old guard of
Cuban exiles to confront the reality of
an island that many had last seen over
two decades earlier, while the new
immigrants' efforts to maintain their
ties to relatives and friends increased
the level of contact between Havana
and Miami. The same trend
occurred in 1994 following the mass
arrival of balseros, refugees who made
the crossing in makeshift boats and
rafts.
In contrast to the entrenched exile
community, most of the new arrivals
had never know any other Cuba than
that of Fidel Castro. They may have
had political grievances against the

regime, but they had grown up eating
treats at Coppelia-a famous Havana
ice-cream parlor-and listening to the
revolutionary songs of Silvio
Rodriguez. It was impossible for
them to reject everything connected
to post-revolutionary Cuba without
denying their own pasts.
These changes in the composition
of the Cuban-American population
have been accompanied by significant
transformations on the island itself.
Many Cubans feared-and others
hoped-that the fall of communism
would mean the end of the Castro
regime as well. While the official
rhetoric remained as strident as ever,
underneath the surface the popular
discourse began to soften, and relations with family members abroad to
become less tense.
The range of contradictory events
reported by the Miami press reflects
the complex reality of Cuba and the
Cuban-American community today.
In the same week you can read about
performers from the island drawing
crowds of Miami fans more interested
in music than in politics, and a surreal invasion attempt by three aging

exiles-one of them 73 years oldtaking a boat to Cuba in a symbolic
gesture of defiance towards the Castro
regime.
The clearest fact to emerge from
this confusion is that a greater variety
of voices is being heard in Miami
today. Cuban intellectuals participate
in seminars and colloquia, and artists
from the island perform without
sparking violent protests. Only certain venues-most notably, the
radio-have been slower to reflect
changing attitudes. Furthermore, the
death last November ofJorge Mas
Canosa, the leader of the CubanAmerican National Foundation,
prompted widespread speculation
concerning the decline of the more
orthodox camp of the exile community. A broader perspective on such
events, however, suggests that they
owe more to an ongoing, complex
process of change than to the death
of a single man, much less one who
was a master at changing tack according to the prevailing winds.
Today, those winds are blowing tidings of peace. Cubans everywhere
are fed up with empty rhetoric and
senseless violence; they are setting
aside their guns for a chance to
enter into a meaningful dialogue.
The fall of communism has left an
ideological void in Cuba, while in
the United States, the economic success achieved by many CubanAmericans has done little to compensate for the lack of a country
they can call their own. This anxiety
has been aggravated recently by the
anti-immigration sentiment sweeping across much of the US. The
pope chose the right time to preach
love and reconciliation; in Cuba and
the US, his message did not fall on
deaf ears. U
Hemisphere " Volume Eight, Number Three
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Stones in the Water
Terry Rey

T

ousted democratically
elected Jean-Bertrand
he military regime that
Aristide from power in a
September 1991 coup
ruled Haiti until a US
military intervention returned the
priest-turned-president to Port-auPrince in October of 1994. During
the army's three-year reign, the popular sector of Haitian civil society,
decidedly pro-Aristide and anti-junta,
was subjected to a brutal campaign
of organized violence and human
rights abuses. Estimates indicate
5,000 summary executions or disappearances; hundreds, if not thousands, of victims of politically motivated rape; at least 250,000 internally
displaced refugees, with tens of thousands more transformed by the terror into "boat people"; widespread
torture and atrocities; and thousands
of families left to fend for themselves
after breadwinners were forced into
hiding.
While it may be that "by mid-1996,
human rights violations... had
declined so propitiously" that we may
now speak of Haiti's "relative freedom from human rights abuse," as
seasoned Haiti observer Robert
Maguire puts it, three grave problems face Haiti's fragile democracy
and seriously threaten its improved
human rights climate: 1) the lack of
extensive psychological rehabilitation
of both direct and indirect victims of

Terry Rey is assistantprofessor of
African and Caribbeanreligions at
FloridaInternationalUniversity and a
former professor of sociology of religion at
L'Universitid'Etat d'Haiti in Port-auPrince, where he workedfor five years as
a human rights activist.
8
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Haiti as a nation bears the scars of debilitating psychological
trauma. These scars represent a formidable obstacle to social
reconciliation and a stable democratic society based on the rule
of law and respect for human rights.

human rights abuse and their families; 2) troublesome trends in the use
of unnecessary force and the abuse
of power by members of the current
Haitian National Police (Police
Nationale Haitienne, or PNH); and
3) the spectacular failure of the
Haitian judicial system to prosecute
human rights violators from both the
coup and post-coup periods and to
guarantee the rights of the citizenry.
Unless these problems are resolved,
Haiti seems likely to regress into yet
another human rights nightmare.
RECOGNIZING THE NEED FOR

REHABILITATION

Abuses committed by the Haitian
Armed Forces (Forces Armees
d'Haiti, or FAdH) and their paramilitary supporters against members of
Haiti's teeming web of grassroots
organizations and their families were
so widespread from September 1991
to September 1994 that a recent
study found that fully 80% of the
Haitian population was either directly or indirectly victimized. This figure might be greeted with skepticism
by all but the victims and their families themselves, their communities,
and the network of Haitian and
international NGOs that, greatly
overwhelmed, struggled to provide
them with care and support.
Commenting on the enormous size
of the coup-period victim pool, Drs.
Cecile Marotte and Herv6

Razafimbahiny, who headed the
UN/OAS Human Rights Civil
Observer Mission's Medical Unit
during the height ofjunta violence,
correctly draw attention to the sobering fact that when assessing "the
affected community...that constituted the target of the repression, it is
civil society itself that is in question."
In effect, Haiti as a nation today
bears the scars of debilitating psychological trauma. These scars represent a formidable obstacle on the
path to social reconciliation and a
stable democratic society based on
the rule of law and respect for
human rights. At this juncture in
Haitian history, assert Marotte and
Razafimbahiny, to the traditional list
of fundamental human rights must
be added the right of victims to rehabilitation. The first step, they argue,
"is the recognition of this rehabilitation as a right and a priority."
Thanks to the efforts of Marotte,

Razafimbahiny and the USAIDfinanced Human Rights Fund,
important groundwork has already
been laid for the establishment of a
national Haitian center for the rehabilitation of victims of organized violence. A conference on rehabilitation held by the Fund in Port-auPrince in March 1997 attracted representatives of the Haitian government, the Haitian National Truth
and Justice Commission, the UN, the
OAS, the European Union, the

The ongoing struggle for human rights in Haiti

Children at a relief center, Gonaives, Haiti. The army's three-year reigin from September 1991 to October 1994 produced at least
250,000 internally displaced refugees.

American and other embassies or

further this goal. More significant,

human rights NGOs have focused

consulates, the Harvard School of

however, was the unprecedented will-

Social Medicine, and leading Haitian

ingness to work with US-supported
organizations demonstrated by some

their efforts primarily on issues of
redress for violations committed by

activists, attorneys and health professionals. Though overall the event was

tempered by a pessimistic tone, several important steps were taken toward
the center's realization. The participants almost unanimously affirmed
the need for such a program and
established important national and

international collaborative links to

of the most important Haitian

human rights NGOs. These groups
traditionally mistrust any initiatives
linked to American influence.
THE POLICE FORCES

Since the restoration of deumocratic order in October 1994, Haitian

the former junta. Unfortunately,

abuses did not end with President
Aristide's dissolution of the FAdH
soon after his return. While cases of
systematic, state-sponsored, politically
motivated human rights violations
have been relatively few in the interim, an increasing number of grievous abuses implicating members of
Hemisphere " Volume Eight, Number Three
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the US-trained PNH is cause for serious concern. A January 1997
Human Rights Watch/Americas
report noted that trends developing

in the PNH's abuse of power were
alarming." Recent calamitous
police operations to quell social
unrest in Mirebalais and Milot (in
February and March 1998, respectively) hardly allay such concerns;
through July 1997, the Human

1U

Rights Fund documented over 200
cases of alleged violations committed
by PNH agents, ranging from sumA

mary executions and torture to
extortion and intimidation.

b

_

_

_

---

- - -- -- -

--

Tellingly, the Fund's legal assistance
program for victims of police brutality was paralyzed by the almost categorical unwillingness of Haitian
attorneys to take on cases against
accused officers out of fear of retribution. It thus appears that intimidation techniques mastered by the
FAdH have been adopted by elements of the PNH, which only stands
to reason, since the PNH itself
absorbed over 700 ex-FAdH members into its force, and many PNH
leadership positions have been filled
by former soldiers. Another reason
for "alarming" trends in human

rights abuse committed by PNH officers is the haste with which the initial
PNH contingents were trained and
fielded. Instead of the customary 12
months of training, the first rookie

cadets were deployed after only four
months. "We were stupid," says a US
official of that approach.
Human rights violations implicating members of the young police
force are attributable at least in part
to the remunerative advantages of

The future of the human rights struggle in Haiti will depend on homegrown forces for
change and genuine national will.
10 Hemisphere e Volume Eight, Number Three

collaborating with drug cartels and
smugglers. Poor administrative and
material support to officers in the
field and frustration with an ineffective judiciary are also important factors. Many officers, especially in
rural posts, complain that urban
PNH administrators ignore their
requests for supplies and to be paid
on time. Weak or corrupt supervi-
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sion has resulted in no fewer than
seven entire contingents deserting
their posts, while other PNH units
have been bought out by traditional
power-wielders, including land
barons and drug dealers. PNH abuses tend to be geographically concentrated in epicenters of black market
smuggling, such as Petit-Goave
(whose first PNH chief was arrested
for complicity in such activities), and
the cocaine ports ofJacmel and
Bainet. In June 1994, several Bainet
fishermen and their families were
arrested and interrogated by PNH
officers as to the whereabouts of
cocaine that had evidently been
tossed overboard when a drug deal
either went bad or came under surveillance at sea. Four of the victims,
one of them five months pregnant,
were allegedly tied to a tree in the
back yard of the local police station
and beaten for three days, while a
10-year-old boy had a pistol fired
beside his ear in an attempt to make
him divulge information. He suffered permanent hearing loss and
the pregnant woman lost her baby.
While such cases implicate obviously corrupt and immoral officers,
even the best-intentioned recruits
work under arduous conditions and
sometimes snap under pressure.
Such cases often result in excessive
use of force or disregard for citizens'
rights. For example, in Port-aPiment, a southern coastal town of
5,000 inhabitants where there is no
electricity, the PNH contingent has
neither a single flashlight nor a functioning vehicle with which to cover
the vast zone under its jurisdiction.
In August 1996 officers there justified shooting an unarmed man who
was demanding payment for having
fixed the police motorcycle tires. As
their sergeant explained, "We had
not been paid in four months at that
point in time, so he could not be tolerated for his impatience!" Officers
who follow legal arrest proceedings
often see their prisoners go free due
to the inability of the justice system

to prosecute criminals successfully.
This situation understandably breeds
frustrations within the PNH. As
weak administrative, material and
judicial support structures erode
PNH morale even further, we can
expect to see an increase in human
rights abuses by the police forces.
ASSESSING THE ROLE OF THE US

Successful judicial reform is perhaps the key to creating a sociopolitical climate in which respect for
human rights in Haiti can move
from the episodic, where it seems
now to stand, to the foundational.
The title of Amnesty International's
January 1997 report, "Haiti: A
Question ofJustice," reflects the centrality of this issue. US Mission
rhetoric also indicates that reforming and strengthening the judicial
system is high on its list of priorities
for Haiti. Washington's commitment to justice and human rights in
Haiti, however, is questionable at
best, given US complicity in training
and supporting some of the most flagrant human rights abusers.
Perhaps more dreaded than the
FAdH were their paramilitary supporters, many of whom were members of the Revolutionary Front for
the Progress and Advancement of
Haiti (Front Revolutionnaire Pour
l'Avancement et le Progres d'Haiti,
or FRAPH). The leader of this
group, Emmanuel Constant, has
revealed that he was on the CIA's
payroll during his organization's
reign of terror. Rather than assist
the Haitian judicial system in bringing Constant to justice for perhaps
thousands of cases of human rights
abuse, the US State Department
allowed him to slip out of Haiti in
December 1994 and settle in
Queens, New York on a tourist visa.
US authorities have since denied
Haitian government requests for
Constant's extradition, instead granting him a work permit. FRAPH documents seized during the US military intervention, moreover, were

not turned over to Haitian authorities until Washington had ample
time to delete sensitive material, and
the bulk of these materials reportedly remain in US custody. Those
engaged in the struggle for justice
and human rights in Haiti thus convincingly argue that in spite of having ousted the oppressive putschist
regime from power, the US has, in
the larger context, ultimately failed
the Haitian people.
In the long run, the human rights
struggle in Haiti must be won by
Haitians with sincere international
support. For the time being, Haiti
relies on foreign donors to fund
such vital programs as training of
new PNH recruits and officers
already in the field, material support
for the national civilian police force,
victim rehabilitation and aggressive
judicial reform. There is no foreign
substitute, however, for the other
critical requirement for progress:
genuine national will. This force for
change must be homegrown and
generated through a "dedichotomization" of Haitian society.
Responsibility for this task, as
Maguire rightly notes, belongs to
both the powerful and the dispossessed, and involves "the need for
those Haitians long accustomed to
regarding the majority of their fellow
citizens as draft animals for the use
in the creation and continuation of
their own well-being to recognize the
legitimate aspirations of those people to improve their lives." At the
same time, Haiti's marginalized peoples must "demonstrate openly and
with increasing determination their
intentions to engage in change constructively, not destructively." At present, Haitian social reality can be
summed up in the words of an old
Creole proverb: Roch nan dlo pa kon
doulh roch nan soley (the stone in the
water knows not the pain of the
stone in the sun). Until this situation can be reversed, true respect
for human rights in Haiti will surely
remain elusive. U
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Guatemala's Critical Juncture
J.

Patrice McSherry

G

from military rule
has been slow
and
transition
difficult, at times
traumatic. Today the
country stands at a

uatemala's

critical juncture, when the danger

of reversals is palpable. In
December 1996, the mood was optimistic as the government of conservative president Alvaro Arzn and the
Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional
Guatemalteca (URNG), the umbrella insurgent organization, signed
final peace accords. This historic
agreement represented the hopes of
a large majority of Guatemalans for
social justice, the rule of law and
political democracy after 36 years of
internal war. Thousands of people
marched and rallied in the central
plaza of the gritty capital city the
night of the official signing. An
unaccustomed sense of liberation
and hope permeated the air.
Since then, conditions have deteriorated rapidly, putting at risk the
peace process and the slow transition from authoritarianism to
democracy. The heavy hand of fear
has descended again, due to the
assassination of several public figures and renewed threats by shadowy groups, as well as a plague of
criminality that makes daily tasks a
treacherous undertaking for most

Guatemalans. Implementation of
the peace accords has been delayed
by the right wing in Congress, which
is blocking required constitutional
reforms. (The accords specify fundamental changes to the 1985 constitution, a holdover from the military state that institutionalized the

j PatriceMcSherry, assistantprofessor
ofpolitical science at Long Island
University/Brooklyn, is the author of
Incomplete Transition:Military Power

and Democracy in Argentina (St.
Martin's Press, 1997), and a number of
articles on the role of the military. She
thanks Radl Molina Mejia fir his comments on this article.
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military's counterinsurgency mission and ideology). Civilian institutions are weak, the military and
intelligence forces remain powerful,
and the Arzn administration has
shown authoritarian tendencies.
Life has not improved for the
majority, and desperate campesinos,
led by a former Catholic priest, have
resumed their invasions of elite-

owned plantations. Combined
police and army forces patrol the
streets, especially at night. The army
thus continues to exercise an internal security role, and the new civil
police force incorporates retired soldiers, undermining the accord on
the military's role in democratic
society. Disillusionment with
democracy and the peace process is
spreading among the population.
The case of Guatemala demands a
rethinking of concepts of democracy that make free elections and civilian institutions their central defining features. These are necessary

but insufficient components of
meaningful democracy. This article
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Rethinking concepts of democracy

Since the Guatemalan peace accords were signed in December 1996, conditions have
deteriorated rapidly, putting at risk the peace process and the slow transitionfrom
authoritarianism to democracy. Life has not improved for the majority; civilian institutions are weak, and the military and intelligence forces remain powerful.

argues that a modicum of social justice and the rule of law are also
essential requisites of democracy.
Despite the formal transition from
military to civilian rule in 1986 and
the renewal of regular elections,
democracy remains thin, and precarious, in Guatemala.
THE GERARDI ASSASSINATION:
EVOKING THE LEGACY OF FEAR

In April 1998, Guatemalan
Auxiliary Bishop Monsignor Juan
Gerardi presided over a public presentation of the report of the
Catholic Church's Project to
Recover Historical Memory
(REMHI) in Guatemala City. The

report documented in graphic
detail the repression in Guatemala
and the destruction of whole communities and tens of thousands of
lives by the armed forces and associated police, intelligence and paramilitary organizations during the
1980s. The report was based on testimonies gathered by church volunteers during the previous three
years in remote regions of the country, often in local Mayan languages.
REMHI worked independently of
the government and the military,
and its efforts were separate from
those of the Truth Commission
established with the help of the
United Nations as part of the peace
accords.
The REMHI report made clear
the utter depravity of military counterinsurgency strategy in the countryside: the scorched earth tactics;
the targeting of indigenous children
and pregnant women (often killed
with machetes); the calculated
dehumanization of victims, who
were made to dance, perform sexual acts, or cook for soldiers in the
midst of massacres; the use of indescribable tortures to create terror in
the community. In a penetrating
analysis, the report showed how "in
the first years of the 1980s the policy
of counterinsurgency was converted
into terrorism of the State, bringing
with it a process of massive destruction." In its essence, the report was
a stunning indictment of the national security state and the armed and
security forces.

Two days after the report was presented, Bishop Gerardi was bludgeoned to death in his garage. The
murderer or murderers used a concrete block to smash his face and
skull. Nothing was stolen.
Almost immediately the police
arrested a local indigent, Carlos
Enrique Vielman, even though he
has a crippled right arm-making it
virtually impossible for him to have
committed the crime.
Developments over the next
months caused the Office of
Human Rights of the Archbishop of
Guatemala (ODHA) and other
human rights leaders to voice suspicions that military intelligence officials were attempting to derail the
investigation.
Government officials implied
from the outset that the murder of
Bishop Gerardi was a common
street crime. In contrast, ODHA
argued that the crime was not an
isolated event, but indicated "the
persistence of sinister, clandestine,
violent groups disposed to collect
the highest social cost in human
lives in order to recuperate the
power that has been ebbing, not
only economic and political power
but also, especially, the power to
decide with impunity the life and
death of Guatemalans." Not until
June did authorities announce that
they were considering the possibility
of political motivation. Members of
the presidential guard on duty the
night of the crime were called in for
questioning on June 2. The guard
Hemisphere e Volume Eight, Number Three
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During Guatemala's civil war, the military counterinsurgency strategy in the countryside involved scorched-earth tactics, the targeting
of indigenous children and pregnant women, and the calculated dehumanization of victims.

is commanded by the Presidential
General Staff, a military unit with a
history of human rights violations.
Vielman's defense attorney insisted
that the murder was a "crime of pas-

stolen. These incidents lent cre-

dence to accusations by opposition

Guatemalans suspected that an officially sanctioned coverup was in
progress.

Congressman Amilcar Mendez that

Terror and impunity have long

key figures in the Public Ministrywhich is leading the Gerardi investi-

been potent weapons for social and

gation-are linked to military intelligence, and were in the past

Today, many Guatemalans believe

involved in organizations that car-

the country's political, military and

Edgar Guti6rrez, director of the

ried out disappearances and mur-

economic elites continue to employ

REMHI project, said publicly that

ders.
In a stunning announcement in
July, ODHA said that two military
officers-one a high-ranking, active
duty officer in the Presidential

a strategy of selective political violence to impede democratization,
block socioeconomic and political
change, and bolster their own
power. The military's tendency to
regard legal political activity as subversive also perpetuates an atmosphere of fear in Guatemala.

sion" and hinted that it might have
resulted from a homosexual tryst.
The church rejected his accusations,
as did some government officials.

Vielman's lawyer was spreading military disinformation and implied
that military intelligence was

employing a "psyops" (psychological
operations) strategy to cover up the
crime.
Also in

June,

six houses linked to

ODHA activists or employees were
broken into and searched, and computer files on the Gerardi case and
video cassettes of exhumations relat14

ing to other investigations were
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General Staff-were involved in the
assassination and were known to the
government. Several days later, in a

spectacularly large operation, police
arrested the other priest living in
the bishop's residence and detained
his cook and his dog. Many

political control in Guatemala.
that powerful organizations within

According to an intelligence docu-

ment leaked to the newspaper El
Peiddico in 1997, the armed forces
continue to conduct surveillance
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against student organizations,
unions and the URNG (now forming a legal political party) despite
the peace accords.
The bishop's murder was one of
several recent assassinations that
seemed calculated to resuscitate
fear. In May, the victims included
the mayor of Santa Cruz del
Quiche, who was associated with the
center-left Frente Democritico
Nueva Guatemala (FDNG), and the
district prosecutor of Retalhuleu
(whose docket included the case of
Efrain Bimaca, the guerrilla who
was married to US lawyer Jennifer
Harbury). Death threats were sent
to FDNG candidates immediately
before the June municipal elections,
made in the name ofJaguar
Justiciero, a death squad linked in
the past to sectors of the military.
Also in May, Father Pedro Nota of
REMHI left the country after receiving death threats. Late in the
month a bomb destroyed the house
of an FDNG mayoral candidate in
Dolores, Peten. Threats were sent
to a number of prosecutors in the
Public Ministry, many of whom said
they would resign without government protection. In June, human
rights and Mayan leaders were subjected to death threats and surveillance by armed men, and in July,
another priest was wounded by
armed gunmen.

credibility of the electoral process.
The poor turnout also reflected the
reawakening of fear and disillusionment with the governing party's use
of old methods of electoral manipulation. As the 1999 presidential
elections approach, FDNG leaders
are proposing an electoral alliance
of center-left forces-including leftist parties, popular organizations
and the URNG-to oppose PAN
and the extreme right Frente
Republicano Guatemalteco (FRG),
the party of former military dictator
Efrain Rios Montt.
Meanwhile, common crime and
delinquency are epidemic. Armed
individuals and gangs enter buses
and assault and rob passengers, people are robbed in the streets and
kidnapped in their cars. Former
military personnel are widely suspected (and sometimes documented) to be involved in criminal gangs
engaged in drug trafficking, car
theft rings, extortion-kidnappings
and other crimes. The absence of
basic public security has political
effects, as a frustrated public begins
to associate democracy with lawlessness. There are indications that
some Guatemalans might accept a
return to la mano dura, or hard-line
rule (for example, by voting for
Rios Montt's party), a situation that
would benefit the most reactionary
elements of the elite.

THE MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS: AN
EXERCISE IN ABSTENTIONISM

CONCLUSIONS

Elections in 30 municipalities
took place on June 7 in the midst of
threats against opposition candidates and charges that the governing party, the Partido de Avanzada
Nacional (PAN), was engaged in
fraud, intimidation and vote-buying.
PAN won 22 of the towns. In
Chinautla, five opposition parties
challenged the election results and
demanded that they be annulled.
The degree of abstentionism-only
some 35% of the electorate votedindicated that citizens doubted the

Contemporary scholarly concepts
of democracy generally emphasize
procedural requirements, such as
free elections and constitutional
institutions. According to this view,
democracy is the framework of institutions and practices that permits
people to choose their rulers freely,
quite separate from issues of socioeconomic equality.
The case of Guatemala, among
others, suggests that this definition
is too narrow. If politics is about
how scarce resources in society are
allocated (who gets what, how and

why), and if social resources include
political and economic goods, then
surely democracy means a more
egalitarian distribution of both.
This, in turn, implies a broader concept of democracy. Certainly for
people who have struggled and died
in order to achieve it, democracy
means much more than an electoral
system: it symbolizes less inequality,
less exploitation, more fairness,
more freedom and more justice. In
other words, a procedural framework is necessary, but content and
substance are also required. The
act of voting is instrumental; people
do not vote simply for the joy of
casting ballots, but in the hope of
improving their lives. Without
meaningful socioeconomic and
political change, elections become
pro-forma and the system loses legitimacy.
The rule of law is another fundamental component of democracy.
The rule of law signifies equality
before the law-one standard for
rich and poor, rulers and ruled-as
well as enforcement of citizenship
rights and limits to the arbitrary
exercise of state power. In Latin
America, however, democratic procedures have often coexisted with
double standards and impunity for
the powerful. In Guatemala, the
rule of law remains tenuous. Rights
are violated and public insecurity
prevails; impunity shields those who
commit atrocious acts. The REMHI
report speaks of the deep and unrequited need for justice in
Guatemala. Without justice and the
rule of law, without basic rights,
democracy is hollow.
Democratic organizations and
individuals in Guatemala are striving for a democracy of social justice,
political inclusion and basic rights.
Simultaneously, powerful forces are
acting in subterranean ways to
retain their hegemony and impede
social change. The shadow of the
past still hangs heavily over
Guatemala. U
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Beyond the Washington Consensus
William C. Smith

C

democracy and combating
rivaled ecoails poverty
for strengthening
nomic integration and
trade-related issues for
center stage at the
Santiago Summit. A foretaste of this
discourse came shortly before the
Summit at a meeting of the
Montevideo Circle in Brasilia, where
International Monetary Fund director Michel Camdessus, InterAmerican Development Bank president Enrique Iglesias and Brazilian
president Fernando Henrique
Cardoso joined the rising chorus of
politicians, international technocrats
and academics proposing a "new
generation" of reforms for Latin
America. All seemed to agree on
the need to overhaul the region's
democratic political systems, which
were portrayed as the primary obstacle to state reform and better living
standards for the majority of the
population. "In conditions of stable
growth," Iglesias said, "it could take
the continent many years-between
50 and more than a century,
depending on the country-to give
all citizens a minimum level of wellbeing on current wealth distribution
trends." Citing survey data showing
that only 27% of Latin Americans
were satisfied with democracy,
Iglesias warned that new measures
were urgently needed to create jobs,
improve health and education, and

William C. Smith is professor of political
science at the University of Miami's
School of InternationalStudies, where
he edits theJournalof Interamerican
Studies and World Affairs. He is the
author of numerous books and articles
on Latin American political economy.
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promote wealth distribution.
Will this embryonic "Southern
Consensus," as President Cardoso
dubbed the convergence of views,
be any more successful in combating
poverty and reducing inequality
than its predecessor, the now
cliched Washington Consensus?
Will the agreements signed by the
hemisphere's presidents in Santiago
usher in bold new strategies to promote sustainable growth and reduce
poverty and inequality?
Sadly, the answer to both these
questions is probably "no."
Pessimism regarding the outcome
of the Santiago Summit is warranted
given the close family resemblance
of the Southern Consensus and
other so-called "second-generation"
reforms to the failed Washington
Consensus. Since it was first codified in 1989 by economist John
Williamson as the least common
denominator the D.C. policy community would support, the
Washington Consensus has experi-

enced a number of doctrinal shifts,
highlighting the salience of several
themes (e.g., the need to fight corruption and protect property rights)
absent in the original version. The
reforms proposed offer few improvements over the original model.
Strengthening political parties and
the electoral system, guaranteeing
the independence of the judiciary,
increasing transparency and efficiency in public spending and other priorities of the Southern Consensus
are welcome, of course. And yet, at
least a mild case of collective schizophrenia is evident in the calls for
new, innovative strategies to combat

poverty, reduce inequality and
strengthen civil society, while simultaneously reiterating the neoclassical
core of the Washingtonian formula
for economic reform. Any significant accomplishments in the areas
of inequality, poverty and democracy
will require transformations in the
state systems and political
economies of the region far more
sweeping than the limited reforms
agreed upon in Santiago. No quick
fix-conceptually or in the policy
realm-will be sufficient.
REVISITING OLD DEBATES:

NEW

THEORIES OF GROWTH WITH EQUITY

With the focus on hemispheric
integration and globalization, we
frequently lose sight of the enduring
debate over the supposed trade-off
between growth and equity.
Following the 1950s thinking
espoused by Simon Kuznets and
Nicholas Kaldor, mainstream economists and social scientists long
believed that poor countries undergoing rapid growth had to accept a
widening gap between the haves and
have-nots. Within this context,
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Dissenting thoughts on democracy, equity and market economics

inequality was not usually seen as a
problem. A market-friendly economic regime based on "getting the
prices right" was presented as the
sine qua non for achieving internal
and external macroeconomic equilibrium, attracting domestic and foreign investment, opening the economy to international trade, and so
on. Only after growth takes off,
according to this perspective, is it
possible to address the ills of poverty; in the meantime, modest "compensatory" social policies targeted at
the most vulnerable groups may be
necessary for political reasons, but
expenditures must be strictly controlled in the interest of fiscal austerity.
In the 1990s, new empirical
research and theorizing on growth
and the importance of "social capital," plus the lessons of East Asian
development trajectories (which
relied on the redistribution of assets,
massive investments in human capital, and strategic state policies to
correct market failures and create
competitive advantages), have seriously eroded the conventional wisdom of Kuznets' "inverted-U"
hypothesis and its neoclassical
premises. Many social scientists now
perceive that greater income equality is not only compatible with but
perhaps even a prerequisite for
faster growth. According to this
major shift in economic thinking,
the right policies-heavy emphasis
on universal education and social
policies with substantial grassroots
involvement-make it possible to
achieve both higher growth and
lower inequality. A direct cause-andeffect relationship may even exist
between policies that reduce
inequality and faster growth; in

other words, greater equity may
actually stimulate economic growth,
not retard it.
Although economists have not
explored this angle, political scientists note that the new growth theories differ significantly from their
neoclassical predecessors concerning the potentially more expansive
role they implicitly ascribe to the
state, public policies, and the conscious choices of social and political
actors. Conventional approaches
advocate rather passive state policies, holding that economic growth
is a result of the accumulation of
physical capital and an expansion of
the labor force, combined with an
"exogenous" factor-technological
progress-that makes capital and
labor more productive. In contrast,
the new growth theories attribute
increases in productivity not to
exogenous factors, but to "endogenous" ones related to the behavior
of public and private actors responsible for the accumulation of productive factors and knowledge.
These behaviors are not immutable;
they can be changed by deliberate
shifts in strategy and policy.
Even if the old consensus on
growth, poverty and inequality
becomes obsolete, forcing greater
equality by any means available is
not a viable strategy for sustainable
development. The policies implemented to reduce inequality matter
greatly. A democratic reform agenda respects macroeconomic equilibrium while pursing strategies and
policies that both empower the poor
and invest in projects that promise
relatively quick and visible payoffs in
terms of improved equity and equality. Poor people invest proportionally more of their income than mem-

bers of the middle or upper class in
the formation of social and human
capital, such as literacy and health.
The poor also "save" by devoting
more family resources to children,
feeding them better, taking them to
health clinics and sending them to
school. Therefore, less inequality
together with greater investments in
social and human capital may be
just as important as investment in
factories and machinery in raising
productivity and spurring more
dynamic economic growth.
Contrary to the neo-utilitarian,
antistate bias of the Washington
Consensus and most of the rhetoric
of the Santiago Summit, one of the
implications of the new growth theories downplayed by the World Bank
is that the "magic of the market" or
the "invisible hand" unfettered by
government simply won't do.
Reconsidering the role of the state
as part of a broader, more ambitious
strategy of human development also
means rethinking the kinds of
democracy capable of formulating
and implementing a new growth
strategy that puts combating poverty
and reducing inequality at the center of the political agenda. In short,
although the range of options may
be highly constrained, there are
important choices to be made.
Making choices necessarily means
that politics-not some allegedly
inexorable market logic-must
assume command in devising development strategies for growth with
greater equity.
DEMOCRATIC SCENARIOS AND THE
"HIGH ROAD" TO GLOBALIZATION

Democratic politics are compatible with a wide variety of capitalist
models. Each of the contemporary
Hemisphere e Volume Eight, Number Three
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variants-ranging from the AngloAmerican model and the social
democratic capitalism of Western
Europe to Asian models of state-led,
but market-friendly capitalism-are
groping toward an accommodation
with the forces of globalization.
Although it may be true that globalization inevitably entails a certain
degree of convergence, there will
continue to be considerable national and regional variation in terms of
policies, institutional forms, and patterns of income and wealth distribution. Cutting through a complex set
of debates, the basic choice is
between "low road" versus "high
road" strategies of incorporation
into the globalization process.
Several years ago, Argentine political scientist Carlos Acuna and I speculated about three broad democratic scenarios for the specific case of
Latin America (see Figure 1). The
first of these scenarios can be said to
involve a "low road," the second a

"middle road," and the third a "high
road" strategy.
In the context of market-oriented
restructuring and accelerated globalization, the most probable scenario for Latin American societies
will be a "low-low" road strategy
leading to dualistic democracies
(S4), in which political elites pursue
Hobbesian strategies. This involves
establishing alliances with strategic
minorities for the purpose of
excluding the majority of the
remaining social actors by disarticulating and neutralizing their capacity
for collective action. A dual logic of
state power and unequal distribution of resources facilitates political
and economic stability in this scenario. According to this elitist logic,
dualistic democratic regimes place
the transition costs of structural
adjustment as well as the long-term
costs of opening the economy on
the poor and unorganized sectors of
society.
An intermediate, middle road scenario combines a full-blown variant
18 Hemisphere " Volume Eight, Number Three
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of market reform with stable, relatively consolidated, but fragmented
and exclusionary democracy (S2).
Considering its success in combining dynamic growth with lower
unemployment and declining poverty rates, Chile can be considered an
example of this middle road strategy. But Chile's route to neoliberal
restructuring with democratic consolidation is not Latin America's
most probable politico-economic
future. On the contrary, successful
neoliberal revolution most likely will
continue as an exception in the
region. There is much to admire in
Chilean democracy, but it must be
recognized that part of its success in
the 1990s is the consequence of
some of the most perverse aspects of
the authoritarian legacy inherited
from the Pinochet regime, a legacy
that in many ways has been preserved and reproduced under
democratic conditions.
If the Chilean middle road is not
replicable in other Latin American
countries, then isn't resignation and
acceptance of modest proposals
such as those contained in the

Southern Consensus the only realistic option? Perhaps, but a more
utopian posture is also an alternative. Why not adopt a high road
route to democracy as the superior
strategy for integration with global
market forces? The logical outcome
of this utopian proposal is a scenario
leading to an inclusionary democracy (S3). Although seemingly "unrealistic" in the present economic circumstances, it can be argued on
normative and political grounds that
this scenario offers the best chance
of addressing issues of poverty, equity and sustained growth under
democratic conditions. It may be
useful to go into some detail concerning this reasoning.
Returning to point C in Figure 1,
in this inclusionary scenario elected
presidents and their economic and
political teams could choose to
abandon Hobbesian strategies. This
would imply the reformulation of
the decision-making process by
strengthening political parties and
fundamental social actors and incorporating them more fully into the
process of policy design and imple-
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mentation. This strategy represents
an attempt to base democratic stability on broad social and political
pacts that would assure major collective actors that their interests
would not be seriously hurt by the
market reforms associated with
structural adjustment and economic
opening. The logic underlying
democratic consolidation coincides
with social democratic models of
capitalism. It also resonates with
the general thrust of proposals calling for, in Marcelo Cavarozzi's
words, "the building of a new developmental state [that] has to reside
in a mix of de-regulation and reregulation. It requires that the state
walk a narrow path of letting the
market operate without choking it
and, at the same time, playing a
coordinating and overseeing role
that private firms left to themselves
would not assume."
The advantage of the social
democratic path is that, in common
with the Chilean middle road, this
high road strategy can lead to a
politico-economic equilibrium with
lower levels of social and political
conflict and better economic performance than at point C. As in S2,
important economic reforms (control over fiscal deficits, privatization,
opening of the economy, etc.) may
be completed. Since the high road
approach envisions more active
state participation in the implementation of social policies and growth
inducement than do the
Washingtonian or Southern versions of economic reform, there are
theoretically persuasive reasons to
believe that it is capable of generating a stable macroeconomic equilibrium with dynamic growth. Such
growth would be similar to that
achieved in the middle road option,
but with a greater emphasis on
equity and more generous and
expansive compensation (via safety
nets, social investments, skill
retraining, etc.) for the "losers" in
the process of competitive integra-

tion. Historical comparisons and
the expected consequences of labor
union participation in the decisionmaking process indicate that the
distributional properties of the
social democratic scenario would be
less regressive than either the low
or middle road strategies. Equally
important, strong economic performance with more equitable distribution of income and wealth, plus the
abandonment of Hobbesian postures, implies a relative deepening
of procedural democracy.
The problem, as noted earlier, is
that in Latin America this maximalist version of social democratic class
compromise is probably not feasible. Nevertheless, it is important
for political and policy reasons to
underscore the possibility of a minimalist version of this scenario under
prevailing conditions. A more flexible, minimalist version of S3 would
require the initiation of closely
interrelated, long-term transformations that would point in the direction of maximalist objectives: state
reform, negotiation with and
strengthening of collective actors,
politico-institutional reforms reinforcing parliamentary mechanisms,
and the expansion of citizenship
rights. In fact, if electoral dynamics
in the context of "encompassing"
institutional arrangements compel a
gradual broadening of the reform
agenda, Chile could possibly go
beyond the middle road equilibrium and advance toward the high
road scenario. If this were to happen, the political and symbolic significance of the Chilean model
would radically change from its current status as exemplar of neoliberalism.
In short, a successful post-neoliberal reform agenda could initiate a
trajectory of democratic deepening.
The key reforms would rearticulate
societal actors, enabling elected
officials to accumulate sufficient
political legitimacy and administrative capacity to sanction those

tempted to transgress social agreements. Greater embeddedness of
state institutions in civil society
would also endow elected officials
with the capacity gradually to
reduce the risks of investment and
provide incentives for social actors
to choose cooperative strategies
over confrontation, thus helping to
institutionalize distributional conflicts within the emergent democratic order. Here parts of the
Southern Consensus and Santiago
Summit proposals for state reform
and an aggiornamentoof democratic
institutions are highly relevant. The
challenge will be to ensure that
these institutional reforms go
beyond conventional neoclassical
perspectives to probe the limits of
the social and political implications
of the new growth theories.
Strengthening procedural and substantive democracy is the means to
achieve great equity in social
arrangements, and both are essential to achieving economic
dynamism in the regional and global orders.
It is possible, and even probable,
that the project for a minimalist
high road social democratic scenario will fall short and constitute
an equilibrium by itself, albeit a
weak one. Still, if the goal is to
avoid low road outcomes while
pointing middle road experiments,
such as Chile, in a more progressive
direction, then even modest levels
of redistribution and economic
growth under more democratic conditions are not to be disdained.
Deepening democracy beyond the
electoral sphere and aggressively
combating poverty and inequality
should not be seen as "add-ons"
espoused for ethical purposes or to
bolster the legitimacy of schemes
for market-driven reform. Strengthening democracy, attacking poverty
and reversing egregious social
inequalities are prerequisites for
sustainable growth in a globalized
hemisphere. U
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Islands Apart
Emilio Pantojas-Garcia

ince the early 1980s,
neoliberal views on economic policy have
acquired increasing prominence throughout the
world. The notion of the
superior efficiency, rationality and
dynamism of the private entrepreneur and the marketplace has
become the dominant weltanschauung among economic development
experts and policy makers. This
shift in the development paradigm
has resulted in the adoption of
regional, subregional and supraregional policies aimed at trade liberalization, the impact of which is
highly debated. Most recently, the
second Summit of the Americas in
Santiago, Chile brought together
hemispheric leaders to discuss the
potential consequences of these
policies. The following is an
attempt to examine some of the
implications for the future development of the insular Caribbean.
The signing of the North
American Free Trade Agreement
(Nafta) was received by Caribbean
political and economic leaders with
a forceful request for trade parity.
This request resulted in the introduction of a bill in the US Congress
known as the Caribbean Trade
Security Act. It and other initiatives
have sought the liberalization of
regional trade to pave the way for
accession to Nafta or full participation in a Free Trade Area of the
Americas (FTAA). The creation of
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the Group of Three (Mexico,
Colombia and Venezuela); the reactivation of the Central American
Common Market; the creation of
the Association of Caribbean States;
and a proposal for a Caribbean
Community single market are examples of the scramble for position by
Caribbean Basin leaders.

CBI. The rapid growth in apparel
assembly was fueled by another special preference program known as
GAL (Guaranteed Access Level program, or "807a" for its section in the
US Customs Code), which ensured
unrestricted access to the US market
for apparel assembled in the
Caribbean Basin from fabric made
and cut in the US. Under this pro-

THE CARIBBEAN PATH TO FREE TRADE

gram, exports of assembled apparel

In the 1980s, Caribbean policy

from the Caribbean to the US more
than doubled in only four years,
from approximately $1.1 billion in

makers and entrepreneurs
embraced a set of pseudo-neoliberal
policies effecting a shift from statedirected to market-centered development strategies. The new policies
were not anchored on the principles
of free trade, but on preferential
treatment of Caribbean commodities by developed countries. The
tandem of preferential regimes that
served as the framework for this creole neoliberalism started with the
launching of the Caribbean Basin
Initiative (CBI) in August 1983, followed by other similar programs.
Despite the free trade rhetoric that
surrounded them, these measures
constituted a neoprotectionist package that fostered a process of economic restructuring centered
around labor- and import-intensive
export processing industries, known
as maquiladoras. Maquila-type operations with limited backward production linkages to the domestic economy multiplied in newly established
free trade zones (FTZs) in the
Caribbean. Among the products
that benefitted most from the CBI
and the new offshore sourcing
arrangements were light manufactures and agroindustrial products.
The apparel industry, the category
of light manufacturing that grew
fastest, was not even covered by the

1987 to $2.5 billion in 1991. By
1995, 807a exports to the US had
risen to $5.5 billion.
Yet, in spite of growth in particular industries, the early impact of
these preferential regimes on export
production was disappointing to US
and Caribbean policy makers.

Between 1984 and 1988, US
Department of Commerce figures
showed that overall exports from
CBI countries to the US declined

from $8.9 to $6.2 billion. Exports
rose to $8.4 billion in 1991, but this
was partly due to the addition of
Guyana to the list of CBI countries
in 1988. In the short run, CBIinduced exports did not compensate
for the decline in traditional

exports. Although by 1994
Caribbean Basin exports to the US
had reached $12.2 billion, assembled apparel accounted for $4.6 billion-more than one-third-of this
amount. The value added by assembled products was, on average, a
meager 25% or less, resulting in an
estimated foreign exchange earning
capacity less than that of traditional
agricultural exports.
US manufacturers have traditionally considered Caribbean countries-with the exceptions of Haiti
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The Caribbean struggles to keep pace with free trade

The Caribbean tourist sector is highly
transnationalized and depends on
imports for food, beverages and equipment. Resort-based complexes have
homogenized their product to the point
that it would be hard to tell the difference between a vacation in Cancun or

-

in Barbados.

and the Dominican Republic-to be

-

relatively high-cost producers, due
to comparatively high wages and levels of unionization. Trade preferences were designed so that
Caribbean-based US and local manufacturers could establish operations
able to compete in the US market
with Asian- and Mexican-based manufacturers. But the CBI/GA!.
regime was too short-lived to allow

the Caribbean islands to become
important competitive export platforms for assembly manufacturing.
The enactment of Nafta just 10 years
after the CBI reestablished the cornparative disadvantages of Caribbean
countries as maquila-type export

r

platforms vis-a-vis Mexico.
In the short run, Mexico's low

wages and proximity to the US, cornbined with Nafta duty-free treatment, give it a nearly insurmount-

i;

able competitive advantage over the

Caribbean. In the textile industry,
for example, freer market access
under Nafta caused the value of
Mexican textile and apparel exports
to the US to grow exponentially,
while the combined value of the
four larger Caribbean exporters
sagged. From 1994 to 1996, figures
from the US International Trade
Commission show that the value of
Mexican textile and apparel exports
to the US grew by 123%, while the
combined exports of the Dominican

--

-=

-

f
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Republic, Jamaica, St. Lucia and
Haiti increased by only 14%.
In light of these developments, it
seems clear that for the insular
Caribbean, trying to maintain a
competitive advantage in low-wage,
labor-intensive maquiladoras is a
self-defeating strategy. The only way
to remain competitive as maquila
export platforms is to deepen the
social and economic disadvantages
of the working population. Lowwage industries will continue to
grow in those countries where policy
makers are willing to go along with
wage-lowering policies such as continued currency devaluations, reductions in public services, and minimum or nonexistent fringe benefits.
Clearly, the Caribbean must adopt
alternative policies to compete in
the new climate of economic
restructuring.

Despite the initial promise of export assembly manufacturing, Nafta merely accentuated the comparative disadvantages of Caribbean countries as maquila-type export platforms vis-d-vis Mexico.

THE CARIBBEAN IN THE EMERGING

ORDER
The analysis of the still-emerging
global division of labor, based on liberalized trade and the freer flow of
investment across national borders,
cannot be conceived as a mere geographic reshuffling in the economic
specialization of some regions. We
are witnessing a set of technological,
HEMISPHERIC

institutional and economic transformations that allow for greater global

mobility of the factors of production
(particularly capital and technology)
on a larger scale than ever before.
The various international agreements, treaties and institutionssuch as the International Monetary
Fund, the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, and the World
Trade Organization-are helping to
implement and reinforce policies at
a level above and beyond the power
of national governments. These
emerging supranational regulatory
frameworks increase the freedom
and security of movement of
transnational corporations and open
up nationally controlled resources.
They simultaneously facilitate the
22

Hemisphere e Volume Eight, Number Three

more complex transnationalization
of economic space and further the
vertical integration of production
into vast global commodity chains.
What role will the Caribbean play
in the trend toward globalization?
The drive towards free trade is
accompanied by the emergence of
new technologies and management
practices within transnational corporations which enable the adoption
on a global scale of flexible production and just-in-time industrial organization. In this context, we can
expect a retrenchment of traditional

assembly manufacturing activities
relying on location-specific FTZs and
the restructuring of labor-intensive
assembly manufacturing on a global
scale. Once goods and capital can

move under global conditions and
supranational rules not easily affected by changes in national governments and their policies, then production sourcing will shift more easily and constantly from country to
country or region to region, both
within and even between trade
areas, in search of lower costs, faster

turnaround times, greater design
flexibility, higher quality and so on.
If the above arguments are correct, then the crown jewels of the
new international trade agreements
are the liberalization of trade and
investment in knowledge-intensive
industries and services. The creation of an FTAA will shift the competitive advantage to postindustrial
activities; knowledge, technology,
creativity and management expertise, rather than location-specific fiscal advantages, will be the key to success in the twenty-first century. In
the Caribbean, this trend can be

defined as peripheral postindustrialization. The emerging crop of
maquiladoras will focus on knowledge-intensive industries and services whose main imported inputs
are knowledge and technology and
whose main exports are royalties,
fees and profits.
The Caribbean already has comparative advantages in tourism and
banking, and has made substantial
progress in telecommunications. In
the 1980s, and in some cases earlier,
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many Caribbean countries developed banking facilities that served
as tax havens for international companies and entrepreneurs involved
in legal tax evasion schemes and
outright illegal activities, such as
drug trafficking or money laundering. At the same time, a successful
package tour resort-based tourist
industry developed in the Caribbean
as an alternative to other, more
expensive destinations for North
American tourists. And in the area
of telecommunications, domestic
and international companies developed a network of processing centers for "800" and "900" lines, driven
by demand from companies and
individuals who peddle a gamut of
services, ranging from psychic readings and party lines to illegal gam-

of a postindustrial strategy cannot
be premised on low wages as the key
competitive advantage for establishing low-end tourism operations,
electronic sweatshops or paper companies that front for tax evasion and
money laundering schemes.
Instead, the Caribbean needs a policy designed to exploit niches of
competitive excellence. The quality
of human resources, infrastructure
and services should be considered
essential components of any development strategy. If the weather is a
natural comparative advantage, it
need not be squandered and sold
cheaply in all-inclusive tourist packages with few linkages to local producers and providers of services.
Policy makers and entrepreneurs
should look at people as a valuable
resource. Trained health care specialists, who usually migrate to developed countries, could get wellremunerated jobs in specialized
retirement communities and medical facilities in the warm tropics.
Cuba has already developed the concept of medical tourism, which generates foreign exchange by providing world-quality medical care to foreigners at costs that are a fraction of
those in the US, Canada or Europe.
And instead of gamblers, psychics
and pornography dealers, more stable and profitable businesses should
be promoted in the Caribbean
telecommunications industry.
Caribbean policy makers, businesspeople, intellectuals and grassroots
leaders should build a diversified
and creative economic strategy from
the ground up. Free trade should
not mean economic regimes in
which the key competitive advantage
rests on the social, economic and

overcome, small- and medium-sized
farmers in, for example, the
Windward Islands could meet many
of the needs of tourist resorts in
Barbados, Curacao, Antigua,
Martinique, Puerto Rico or even
Cuba. Freer trade could facilitate
Cuban imports of Venezuelan oil
and capital to produce fabricated
metals using surplus industrial
capacity. Or, a business alliance
could be established between Puerto
Rican scientists and Cuban laboratories to take advantages of the existing pharmaceutical infrastructure
on both islands. In the area of services, a Caribbean broadcasting
company could promote the expansion of the Caribbean entertainment
industry by encouraging programs
and newscasts from various islands.
Joint program production could be
established among French-, Englishand Spanish-speaking groups
throughout the hemisphere.
The future is full of opportunities,
but if we reproduce the asymmetrical schemes of the past we will only
be changing production styles while
maintaining the skewed socioeconomic order of nearly five decades
of development economics. We
need to think of ways in which the
private, public and social sectors can
interact to produce viable economic
enterprises that serve not just economic niches but wider social and
economic needs. Innovative thinking and daring actions could result
in the creation of an economic
space for small- and medium-sized
producers now relying primarily on
the informal sector for their livelihood. To succeed, any effort in this
direction should be anchored in the
accumulated knowledge and experi-

ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FUTURE

environmental disadvantages of

ence of nongovernmental organiza-

Caribbean development is not
simply an abstract moral issue of
social justice, but rather a crucial
practical issue if economic growth is
to become the basis for providing an
adequate living to the working population of the region. The adoption

large sectors of the population. The
goal of any development policy
should be to take advantage of trade
liberalization to promote commerce
between and among Caribbean producers and consumers. If tariff barriers and political differences were

tions and grassroots enterprises.
There are no easy solutions, but the
overwhelming concern of policy
makers must be to create a development strategy that benefits the
majority of the Caribbean population. U

bling.
Thus far, peripheral postindustrialization in the Caribbean has proceeded along the lines of traditional
economic asymmetries. The
Caribbean tourist sector is highly
transnationalized and depends on
imports for food and beverages,
equipment, etc. Resort-based complexes have homogenized their
product to the point that it would be
hard to tell the difference between a
vacation in Cancun or in Barbados,
except for the phenotypes and
accents of the hotel attendants.
Most jobs created in the tourism sector are low-end positions with heavy
seasonal variations, while telecommunications and data processing
have witnessed the development of
what Barbara Garson calls electronic
sweatshops: low-end repetitive jobs
created to provide international services to individuals and companies.
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Mercosur in the New Global Order
HilioJaguaribe

ithin the next 10
to 20 years, the
post-Cold War
world will face a
choice between
two main alternatives for structuring the international system. The first is a type of Pax
Americana, which implies the expansion and consolidation of the United
States' existing global hegemony.
The second is the formation of a
multipolar system under the direction of a world council composed of
several great powers, operating
through the United Nations.
Whichever scenario prevails, it will
almost certainly include elements of
the other. US hegemony must take
into account the interests of the
European Union, Russia, China and
the UN. Likewise, any multipolar
system that emerges will reserve a
key role for the US.
PAX AMERICANA

The prospect of US hegemony
seems plausible if we consider that
such a state of affairs is already well
on its way to realization. And yet,
the consolidation of this system
depends on domestic conditions
and a favorable international environment, both of which seem to be
working against it.
The US does not display the
domestic sociopolitical conditions
favorable to the formation of an
imperial project. Unlike all other
successful empires to date, the US is
a democracy. Since the Vietnam
War, the American people have
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As long as North American companies remain more competitive
than their South American counterparts, an FTAA is incompatible with Mercosur interests.
opposed international involvements
that imply high financial costs, tax
increases and loss of American lives.
At the same time, politico-military
conditions favor US hegemony and
have allowed the US to formulate,
and partially implement, such a project. This fact can be explained by
the nature of the "center of power"
in the United States, consisting of
the technocratic elite-which controls the media and crucial access to
information-and the elected officials under its sway. This center of
power understands that as long as
American companies are able to
compete with Japan, the process of
globalization will automatically favor
US economic hegemony. The Gulf
War helped convince this group that
times have changed since the
Vietnam War: The US now has the
ability to liquidate the vital centers
of any of its enemies-especially in
the Third World-at a very low cost,
almost without loss of life or international risk.
Even if domestic conditions were
conducive to a sustained US imperial project, the idea has not been
greeted favorably by the rest of the
world. Some of the reasons for this
rejection can be found by looking at
the Roman Empire, the greatest
imperial project in world history.
The main difference between the
Pax Romana and a possible Pax
Americana is the fact that Rome represented an extremely attractive
opportunity to provincial elites. To

be sure, Rome first had to conquer
its empire, including Gaul, Hispania,
Egypt, Dacia, Britain and the Asian
lands along the Mediterranean.
Once the military phase of conquest
was completed, however, local elites
welcomed the Pax Romana. It provided them with protection against
barbarian invaders, equitable judicial and legal systems, personal safety, expanded commerce, local development, and access to culture and
education. Those who accepted
Greco-Roman culture gained new
social mobility, without regard for
racial discrimination. The empire
collapsed due to the internal decadence that set in during the third
century, when the Pax Romana deteriorated into an oppressive regime.
In other words, Rome fell when it
was no longer attractive to the
provinces.
Unlike the Roman Empire, the US
imperial project has no appeal for
provincial elites. The US does not
view its dominion as an empire to be
administered equitably and rationally, but rather as a venture designed
to benefit US companies. The
underlying philosophy seems to be,
may the best man win. If the
provinces lose, it is because they are
not competitive enough to keep up
with changing global conditions and
therefore deserve their destiny.
A MULTIPOLAR SYSTEM
Multipolarity represents a possible
alternative to US hegemony. The
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Why South America should reject the FTAA

economic strength of the European
Union appears to favor a multipolar
system, as does the emergence of
two great powers: Russia, assuming
it recovers from the chaotic transition from totalitarian communism
to democratic capitalism, and
China, if it continues the extraordinary development begun under
Deng Xiaoping. Other potential
players on the world stage include
India, the Mercosur trading bloc,
and the Islamic countriesespecially if they form a union
among themselves.
International rejection of US
hegemony is an important factor
favoring multipolarity. Any external policy the European Union
adopts is bound to be more attractive to the rest of the world; even
the US might view such a policy as
an acceptable alternative to its own
dominance. And yet, the
Europeans have been unable to
agree on such a policy. This is
because external relations, more so
than economic interests, are to a
large extent determined by sociocultural affinities. Viewed in this
way, Europe is firmly divided
between the Continent and the
island nations of the United
Kingdom. In sociocultural terms,
England is much closer to the US
than to the rest of Europe. The
Continent itself is split along
numerous lines; some countries
favor the single euro currency,
while others reject it. If the euro
supporters predominate, the probability of formulating a common
external policy will increase.
It is in this context that Mercosur,
although still only a modest player
on the world scene, could play an
ultimately decisive role.

MERcosuR's PosrnIoN
More than merely
a means to expand
exports and economic development within its
borders,
Mercosur gives
member countries (Argentina,
Brazil, Paraguay
and Uruguay) the
opportunity to
play an influential
role in world affairs.
In the likely event that
the pro-euro countries of
Europe develop a common
external policy, Mercosur could
offer important economic, political
and cultural advantages to consolidate this position.
Clearly, among the two competing
scenarios for the emerging global
order, the countries of Mercosur prefer a multipolar system, with the new
avenues of influence it offers. To be
in a position to advocate such a system, Mercosur must consolidate and
expand the area under its control,
with the inclusion of Chile, Bolivia
and, ultimately, all of South America.
It must also prepare for a flat-out
rejection of the Free Trade Area of
the Americas (FTAA) proposed by
the Summit of the Americas process.
As long as North American companies remain more competitive than
their South American counterparts,
an FTAA is incompatible with
Mercosur interests. In an attempt at
diplomacy, Mercosur's members
have avoided a direct statement of
this position, instead attempting to
delay the FTAA negotiations.
FTAA supporters argue that the
accord would increase North

American
investments in
Latin America. But the
mere fact of a common market does
not attract investors, except in such
cases as the US and Mexico, where a
common border exists. Increased
foreign investment is a viable
prospect only within large, protected
markets, open only to those foreigners willing to engage in production
within their borders. Without tariff
barriers, North American competitors would inundate South American
markets with goods and services at
the cost of domestic producers. An
FTAA would reduce Mercosur's
industrial capacity, resulting in
increased unemployment.
If Mercosur were to enter the
FTAA, the prospects of a multipolar
world system would be drastically
reduced. South American countries hoping to reap the benefits of
multipolarity and exert a minimum
of international influence must
firmly reject entry into such an
agreement, concentrating instead
on the expansion and consolidation
of Mercosur. U
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Canada's Southern Exposure
Peter McKenna

In

Minister Jean Chretien of
Canada,
Januarywith
1998,a coterie
Prime of
provincial premiers, businesspeople and university presidents, led the largest-ever
Canadian trade mission to Latin
America. The "Team Canada" mission, which involved high-profile visits to Mexico, Brazil, Argentina and
Chile over a 13-day period, resulted
in some $1.1 billion in signed business contracts and letters of intent.
The Canadian government also
received firm assurances that meaningful negotiations would soon begin
on a trade and investment agreement between Ottawa and the member governments of Mercosur, an
important customs union and trade
grouping of Brazil, Argentina,
Paraguay and Uruguay. The trip
gave Canada a chance-in light of
President Clinton's failure to secure
"fast track" negotiating authority
from the US Congress-to indicate
its implacable support for a proposed Free Trade Area of the
Americas (FTAA) by the year 2005.
More important, it represented the
growing salience of Latin America in
the conduct of Canadian foreign policy. This salience was clearly manifested in Canada's active role at the
April 1998 Summit of the Americas
in Santiago, Chile.
CoLD WAR SPARKS INTEREST

It is worth remembering that up
until the mid-1980s, Latin America
was of little interest to Canadian gov-
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ernments, and a posting to be deftly
avoided by career foreign service
officers. With endemic poverty, brutal military governments and devastating civil wars in Central America,
the region presented more problems
than promises. Interestingly
enough, the intensification of
Canada's relationship with the
Americas can be traced back to the
Cold War, and especially Canada's
initial involvement in the debilitating
conflicts in Nicaragua and El
Salvador. Serious concerns about
regional security, human rights and
migration flows brought Central
America directly into contact with
Canadian interests. The search for
stability, economic recovery and an
end to violent conflict manifested
itself in Canada's participation in the
1987 Esquipulas II peace process.
This, in turn, had the bureaucratic
derivative of creating, for the first
time, a cadre of Canadian foreign
policy officials with an intimate
knowledge of, and responsibility for,
inter-American affairs.
Of course, the end of the Cold
War-and the East-West prism
through which much of Latin
America was viewed-set the stage
for Canada's growing role in hemispheric issues. Not only did this dramatic structural change diminish the
perceived national security pretext
for US involvement in the region
and thereby open up some diplomatic space for Canada, it also moved
the focus away from sterile
political/ideological considerations
to more critical economic questions.
Moreover, as military governments
gave way to civilian and more democratic regimes, Canada gained an
opportunity to help foster and consolidate the process of democratiza-

tion. Finally, the crushing debt crisis
of the 1980s, which spawned a series
of painful neoliberal adjustment programs throughout the region, precipitated a number of trade and
investment reforms which were
favorably received by officialdom in
Ottawa. In short, this confluence of
factors has enabled the wider
Canadian-Latin American relationship to virtually "take off" in the postCold War period, culminating in a
push to strengthen and deepen a
variety of diplomatic, economic and
political linkages.
In part, Canada's decision to join
the Organization of American States
(OAS) in January 1990, after more
than 40 years of steadfast aloofness
from this body, was a response to the
growing aperturain Latin America.
After taking its vacant chair at the
OAS Council table, the Canadian
government demonstrated its commitment to both the Organization

and the region by playing a highprofile role in restoring deposed
Haitian President Jean-Bertrand
Aristide to power. In addition, there
was a dramatic increase in the number of official visits by senior
Canadian government officials to the
region, with particular emphasis on
Mexico. In fact, by the beginning of
1994, Canada, Mexico and the US
had concluded the most significant
trade accord in the world-the
North American Free Trade
Agreement (Nafta)-with a combined GDP of over $1 trillion.
ECONOMIC AND POLImICAL
SIGNIFICANCE

In an age of globalized markets
and declining trade prospects in
Europe, Canada's economic relationship with Latin America has taken
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Latin America's northernmost neighbor takes an
interest in hemispheric affairs

Parliament House, Ottawa. There is a real sense in Ottawa

political

circles that Canada can make a difference in the region, carving

out a niche role for itself while benefiting enormously from expanding a variety of contacts with the countries of the Americas.

on greater importance. Canadian
businesspeople have finally "discov-

foreign investment in Chile (with
which Canada signed a free trade

ered" Latin America's numerous

agreement in late 1996), Brazil and
Argentina. Two-way trade with the
region as a whole has shown steady

trade and investment

opportunities,

and have aggressively sought to capitalize on Canada's positive image
and reputation in the region. Since

the introduction of Nafta, two-way
trade between Canada and Mexico
has increased dramatically, growing
by some 30% to reach approximately
$4.7 billion in 1996. Canadian
investment in Latin America, while
still far from reaching its

full

poten-

tial, surpassed $845 million in 1996,
a substantial increase from previous

years. In addition, Canada ranks at
or near the top in terms of trade or

progress since 1994, growing from
$8 billion to almost $11.1 billion in
1997, with Canadian exports increasing from $1.7 billion to more than
$3.3 billion last year.
Politically speaking, Canada's
relationship with Latin America has
expanded substantially in terms of
high-level visits, ministerial
exchanges and official contacts.
Clearly, Canada's motivations for
enhancing personal and political ties
with the region stem from a belief

that strong government-togovernment relations hold the key
to unlocking the door to trade and
investment opportunities. In addi-

tion, closer official linkages bolster
Canadian foreign policy by identifying like-minded countries willing to
collaborate in multilateral fora such

as the United Nations and the OAS.
These relationships serve as an
important counterweight to
Canada's closest ally, the United
States, sending a pointed message to
Washington not to take Canadian

interests and support for granted.
Symbolically, then, it is important for

Canada's political leadership to
strengthen contacts with

I

atin
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America as a means of reaffirming
Canadian independence and reducing the country's perceived dependence on its superpower neighbor.
Canada's membership in the OAS
has also helped to revitalize this
body. Canada is the OAS's second
largest contributor, and its active,
constructive and vocal participation-albeit tinged with a certain
amount of caution-is evident with
regard to a host of issues, from OAS
reform to security-related matters.
Canadian participation has been
most animated with regard to the
integral question of democratic
development. As the driving force
behind the establishment of the OAS
Unit for the Promotion of
Democracy, Canada is a firm believer
in stabilizing the region, thereby creating the conditions for peace and
economic development.
CUBA POuCY
Perhaps the most controversial
aspect of Canada's broadening relations with Latin America is its
approach toward Castro's Cuba. Not
only did Canada refuse, in the face
of intense US pressure, to sever
diplomatic relations with revolutionary Cuba in the wake of the Cuban
missile crisis, but it has maintained
cordial and friendly relations with
Havana ever since. In fact, in
January 1997 Canada's foreign minister, Lloyd Axworthy, took a wellpublicized trip to the island to meet
with senior Cuban authorities
(including Castro himself). He
came away with a 14-point joint declaration which included a pledge by
both parties for increased cooperation on the issue of human rights.
Moreover, officialdom in Ottawa,
much to the chagrin of Washington,
has steadfastly opposed the US economic embargo against Cuba and
the island's continued isolation in
the hemisphere. For this reason,
Canada has become Cuba's largest
trading partner and greatest source
of foreign investment. Canadians
28 Hemisphere e Volume Eight, Number Three

Canada's opposition to the Helms-Burton law has helped solidify the country's positive and constructive reputation in Latin

America, in stark contrast to the often "bullying" approach
ascribed to the US.
also rank first in terms of hardcurrency carrying tourists to the
country. The Canadian government,
in anticipation of an inevitable end
to the US embargo, clearly hopes to
take advantage of its existing presence on the island to increase the
market share Canadian businesspeople have already carved for themselves.
Canada's Cuba policy of "constructive engagement," or "principled
pragmatism," was significantly com-

plicated by the March 1996 Cuban
Liberty and Democratic Solidarity
(Libertad) Act, commonly known as
the Helms-Burton law. From the
outset, Canada criticized the antiCuba law, and took its case to the
highest levels of the US government.
Ottawa has not been satisfied with
the Clinton administration's willingness to waive some of the law's more
objectionable provisions, and continues to seek ways to rescind or amend
it, including the possibility of a Nafta
challenge. Canada's opposition to
Helms-Burton is based on the
"extraterritorial" reach of the law, its
contravention of OECD trade and
investment rules, its negative implications for Canadian investors in Cuba,
and its domestic political significance. Interestingly enough, this
opposition has helped solidify
Canada's positive and constructive
reputation in Latin America, in stark
contrast to the often "bullying"
approach ascribed to the US.
The sharp differences between the
US and Canadian approaches to the
"Cuban problem" were highlighted
by Prime Minister Chretien's two-day
official visit to Cuba in late April of
this year. In addition to discussing

an investment protection agreement,
international terrorism and drug
smuggling, Chretien raised the issue
of human rights. He presented
Castro with a short-list of political
prisoners whose release is being
sought by Canada and met with
Cuba's Catholic Cardinal, Jaime
Ortega. Canadian officials also met
with Cuban dissidents, and Chretien
himself lectured the Cuban leader
on the kinds of liberalization needed before other governments will
roll out the hemispheric red carpet.
In the end, the prime minister came
away with no major breakthroughs,
despite a vague promise from Castro
to consider signing the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights.
Critics and supporters will certainly disagree over the success or failure
of the visit, but there is no doubt
that both countries derived certain
tangible benefits, in addition to
strengthening a longstanding diplomatic, political and economic relationship. The meeting further
cemented Canada's trade and investment stake in Cuba, sharply contrasted Canada's policy of "constructive
engagement" with the confrontational and isolationist approach adopted
by the US, and resonated positively
amongst the Canadian public. In
turn, Castro enhanced a close political, commercial and technological
relationship with a member of the G8, acquired a certain amount of
international legitimacy and
respectability, and gained another
platform from which to condemn
the US economic embargo. In
short, the visit allowed Canada to
reaffirm its economic relationship
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came way with an agreement to
launch serious talks in September to
negotiate an FTAA by the year 2005.

r

Canada was selected to chair the first
18 months of the discussions, and

-

Open-pit nickel mine near Moa, Cuba. In recent years, Canadianfirms have invested
heavily in Cuba's mining sector

with Cuba before the US embargo is
rescinded, while Cuba underscored
the antiquated and absurd nature of

US policy towards the island.
Arguably, the most unexpected
(and unstated) linkage between
Canada and Latin America has been

in the military-security domain.
With Canadian security interests
inextricably linked to events in the

Americas, Ottawa is now actively
seeking to intensify military ties with
these countries through various joint

naval exercises, peacekeeping activities and military officer exchange

programs. However, while ensuring
stability and respect for democratic
principles in the region is an important consideration for these

enhanced military contacts, Canada's
overarching objective is to increase
the likelihood of securing additional
trade and investment opportunities
in Latin America.
THE SUMMIT AGENDA

This goal was made clear at the

thus will be in a strong position to
influence the shape and direction of
the talks. Second, Canadian officials
were successful in their efforts to
expand the Summit agenda beyond
trade matters to include a social
action plan to address the issues of
poverty, human rights and indigenous peoples, democracy, education
and health care. Despite opposition
from a number of Latin American
countries concerned about interference in their internal affairs, Ottawa
and Washington secured agreement
on including formal links with environmental, labor, business and academic groups in ftture trade talks.
Finally, Canada will chair a meeting
of hemispheric trade ministers in
1999 and, more important, will host
the next Stmmit of the Americas in
2001.
In closing, it is clear that Latin
America in the 1990s has become
increasingly more salient to Canada's
foreign economic policy. This trend
is likely to continue well into the
next millennium, as the possibility of
a hemispheric free trade arrangement keeps Canada's attention firmly focused on this part of the world.
There is a real sense in Ottawa political circles that Canada can make a
difference in the region, carving out
a niche role for itself while benefiting enormously from expanding a
variety of contacts with the countries
of the Americas. Canada must continue to broaden and deepen these
linkages if it hopes to reap the trade
and investment rewards in the short
and long term. Ultimately, however,
Canada's future role as a legitimate
inter-American partner will be a

function of Ottawa's level of interest
and political commitment. If this

Santiago Summit of the Americas,

political will is not forthcoming,

where Canada fulfilled a number of

Canada's most recent "discovery" of

its stated policy objectives. First, it

the Americas could be for naught U
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Distant Brothers
Manuel Orozco

undreds of thousands of
Guatemalans,
Nicaraguans and

1980s,

Salvadorans fled
their countries in the
mostly for the United States.

Most were escaping various forms of
political instability and repression, as
well as economic crises and social
injustice related to the civil wars in
the region. Two-thirds of the Central
Americans in the US in 1990 had
immigrated to this country in the

1980s, helping to explain the fact
that the vast majority of Central
Americans in this country are foreign
born (see Figure 1).
This article addresses a range of
issues that have influenced the development of three groups of Central
Americans-Guatemalans,
Nicaraguans and Salvadorans-as a
political diaspora in the US. The discussion points to five major conclusions. First, the international interests or priorities of Central
Americans are country-specific,
rather than regional. Second,
although Central Americans in the
US share mainstream foreign policy
objectives, their efforts have not been
incorporated into the US foreign
policy establishment. Third, efforts
to advance these foreign policy interests are relatively recent, organizationally weak and lack broad consen-
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sus. Fourth, for most Central

Manuel Orozco is a researcher at the
Tomas Rivera Policy Institute (TRPI) in
Austin, Texas and a political consultant
on Latin American issues. Research fJr

this article was drawnfrom a lamer
TRPI project and from independent
research on Nicaraguans in the US.
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Florida state representatives Lincoln Diaz Balart and Ileana Ros-Lehtinen join
Nicaraguan immigrant organizations in a rally on Capitol Hill. Miami's

The CentralAmerican diaspora

Nicaraguanpopulation has used its electoral support as a bargainingchip in efforts to change immigration policy for Nicaraguans.
Photo courtesy of FraternidadNicaragiiense.
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Americans in this country, international mobilization is secondary to
US domestic concerns. Finally, the
implications of Central American
ethnic mobilization for the US
national interest, especially in cities
with large Central American populations-such as Houston, Los Angeles,
Miami and Washington, D.C.-are
compatible with the liberal American
ethos, tending toward increased
incorporation and democratization.
The sources used to reach these
conclusions include the available literature on the "Latino diaspora";
demographic and economic data
from the US Census, World Bank
and International Monetary Fund;
and interviews in 1997 with Central
American diplomatic officials, US
State Department officials, US congressional representatives, the leaders of more than 30 US-based
Central American organizations, US
embassy officials in Central America
and representatives of Latin
American NGOs.
INTERNATIONAL INTERESTS OF THE
CENTRAL AMERICAN DIASPORA

A clear indicator of the importance Central Americans attach to
maintaining links to their home
countries is their financial commitment to relatives living in Central
America. As Figure 2 shows, the
amount of money migrants send to
their families in the form of remittances often exceeds total US foreign
aid.
The factors motivating Central
Americans to preserve their ties to
their homelands include such key
issues as immigration, development
and trade. Immigration policy especially has been a key rallying point
for Central Americans in the US.
Development, another main concern, is normally viewed in a humanitarian light, with emphasis on education and health care. Chambers of
commerce serve as liaisons to promote trade between Central America
and the US.
32 Hemisphere 9 Volume Eight, Number Three
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Central Americans in the US are
also interested in political stability.
Their experiences in war-ravaged
countries make Central Americans
sensitive to current events in the
region. Central Americans in the US
show particular concern for peace
and democracy in their home countries, in the belief that stability in the
region is the key to ensuring its
progress toward democracy.
Most Central American organizations in the US were formed to protect the interests of the emigrant
population in this country. These
groups include immigrant services
organizations such as the Central
American Resource Center
(Carecen) and the Fraternidad
Nicaragiense. However, growing
numbers of community organizations are attempting to involve themselves more directly in Central
America. US Salvadoran communities in particular have produced a
recent surge of associations that promote community development in El
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Salvador, mostly in the areas of education and health care. And as
already mentioned, the various
Central American chambers of commerce play a key role in forging business ties between the US and Central
America, helping to connect small
US-based Central American businesses with businesses in their home
countries.
COUNTRY-SPECIFIC POSITIONS

On the whole, Central Americans
in the US express their international
interests in the context of specific
countries. There are few examples
of groups advocating a regional foreign policy or international position,
even with regard to economic integration with the US. Nicaraguans,
Salvadorans and Guatemalans have
concentrated their efforts on maintaining connections to their individual homelands, without integrating
their interests regionally.
A few factors help explain this
country-specific pattern. First, the

Features: Central Americans

also exists among the countryspecific chambers of commerce.
The Salvadoran, Guatemalan and
Honduran chambers teamed up to
create a regional Central American
Chamber of Commerce, which is
credited with various investment projects.

US Aid
$3.3 billion

Remittances
$748 million
GUATEMALA

INTERNATIONAL LINKS AND THE US
FOREIGN POuCY ESTABLISHMENT

US Aid
$1 billion

EL SALVADOR

Remittain

$1 billo

NICARAGUA

*

L

1

Remittances
$4.5 billion

Aid data lir the 1980-1994 period. El Salvador remittances, 1978-1994; Guatemala, 1988-1993; Nicaragua, 1980-1994.
Sources: World Bank, OECD.

nations of Central America reflect
very different social and political
experiences. In general,
Nicaraguans identify themselves as
exiles from communism, Salvadorans
as refugees from civil war, and
Guatemalans as victims of ethnic persecution. These differences come
into play when different nationalities
consider working together.
Central Americans in the US also
tend to be concentrated in different
geographical areas. The majority of
Nicaraguans reside in Miami, while
over half the Salvadorans and
Guatemalans in this country have settled in California. The rest are scattered among other major cities,
including Washington, D.C., which
has an especially large Salvadoran
population. There have been few
opportunities for regional interests
to develop, given that these groups
do not interact regularly.
An important exception to country-specific concerns is reaction to
US immigration policy. Guatemalans

and Salvadorans have occasionally
joined forces to influence legalization and asylum policy, particularly
during the battles over the
Immigration Act of 1990, and
Central Americans in general have
sometimes formed alliances with
other immigrant groups to present a
united front against the antiimmigration backlash. More recently, after gaining passage of the 1997
Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central
American Relief Act, Nicaraguans
supported similar legislation for
Hondurans.
Other cases of regional or semiregional cooperation have emerged
in recent years. One involves the
relationship between the Salvadoran
American Health Foundation
(SAHA) and the American
Nicaraguan Foundation (ANF).
SAHA influenced and participated in
the creation of the ANF in 1992, and
together the two groups helped create a similar health assistance organization in Guatemala. Cooperation

Recent research and interviews
with State Department officials point
to four major issues dominating US
foreign policy agenda toward Central
America: immigration, democracy,
trade and development. These concerns are the same ones expressed by
Central Americans in the US; however, most foreign policy lobbying is
carried out by international organizations or by Central American-based
groups, and not by Central
Americans in this country.
Interviews with US foreign policy
officials involved with Central
American affairs confirm this point.
One official commented that the
"civil society and NGO groups that
approach the USDOS or an embassy
on behalf of those countries tend to
be European or US-driven." This
source added that "you will see the
more educated Central American
migrants taking up those causes. But
for the time being, it's been US people through an organization like
Amnesty International or the
Washington Office on Latin
America-you know, big umbrella
organizations-who have done the
lobbying."
The absence of systematic ethnic
lobbying of the foreign policy establishment does not, however, imply
that Central Americans in the US do
not influence official channels.
Nicaraguans in particular have informally lobbied foreign policy officials
over property rights, politics and
human rights conditions in
Nicaragua. They influenced the
drafting of the Helms Report in
1992, which warned the Chamorro
Hemisphere e Volume Eight, Number Three
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government that US aid to Nicaragua
would depend on improved political
conditions and the return of property confiscated by the Sandinistas.
Local organizations have also successfully lobbied mayors and governors
in areas with large Central American
populations. In Chicago, for example, the Association of Salvadorans in
Illinois (ASI) lobbied Senator Luis
Gutierrez over Salvadoran migrant
issues. After visiting El Salvador and
learning about poor conditions in
that country, Gutierrez supported
the extension of temporary protected status for Salvadorans.
Nicaraguans have had similar success
in lobbying Florida state representatives and the mayor of Miami, using
their electoral support as a bargaining chip in their efforts to change
immigration policy for Nicaraguans.
The foreign policy interests of
Central American immigrants often
coincide with mainstream definitions
of US national interests, at times
indirectly advancing US interests in
Central America. How then can one
explain the absence of effective foreign policy lobbying? One reason is
that Central Americans in the US
have not prioritized international
mobilization to the extent that they
have promoted their domestic interests. There also appears to be a link
between historical perceptions of the
US government and ethnic lobbying;
for example, Nicaraguans tend to
have a more positive attitude towards
the US government than Salvadorans
and Guatemalans. Finally, ethnic
lobbying may be absent because the
organizations that protect Central
American interests are still new on
the political scene.
THE RECENT ORIGINS AND LIMITED
CONSENSUS OF INTERNATIONAL

ACTIVISM
The groups and associations that
link Central Americans with their
home countries are recent innovations. Most came into being after
1990, and tend to be small and short34 Hemisphere e Volume Eight, Number Three

Immigrants do not represent a threat to national unity and
identity; Central Americans in this country are interested in
becoming a part of US society, and their interests in their
home countries are similar to those of the US foreign policy
establishment.

lived (the average life span is less
than three years). They do not
mobilize in a unified manner, and in
most cases devote more time and
resources to domestic activities than
international issues. However, the
increasing number of these organizations suggests that in the future at
least one group-Salvadorans-may
strengthen its institutional basis.
Four types of organizations mobilize the efforts of diaspora populations to reach out to their home
countries: community-based organizations, NGOs, business organizations and professional associations.
Of these four, community-based
organizations are the most numerous, yet they have the smallest membership. Hometown associations
often depend on the personal drive
of their president or founder. In
other cases, the organization may
exist in name, but in practice its
membership is reduced to a handful
of people who rarely carry out significant activity.
Yossi Shain's categorization is useful for describing the varying degrees
of collective participation by Central
Americans in these organizations.
Shain describes diaspora communities as being comprised of three
groups: core members, rearguard
members and silent members. Core
members are those "organizing elites
who are intensively active in diasporic affairs" and who are in a position to appeal for mobilization of the
larger diaspora. Rearguard members
are those who are available to be
mobilized when the active leadership
calls upon them. Silent members are
a larger pool of people who are gen-

erally uninvolved in diaspora affairs,
but who may mobilize under crisis.
As Shain asserts, they "are mostly
part of an 'imagined community,' to
use Benedict Anderson's expression,
often existing only in the mind of
diasporic political activists, as well as
home or host governments." And yet,
this imagined community is often
surprisingly effective; for example, a
Salvadoran organization in Miami
with only three active members routinely draws close to 100 people to its
events, thanks to the pull of rearguard members who volunteer on a
short-term basis.
Central American diaspora organizations are largely comprised of four
kinds of core individuals: community
leaders, intellectuals and artists, leading exiles and wealthy immigrants.
Generally, these core individuals represent an array of interests and attitudes towards their home countries,
making cooperation difficult.
Salvadorans have been most successful at developing intra-organizational
cooperation. Former Ambassador
Ana Cristina Sol was able to bring
together (and create) a large group
of Salvadoran organizations with the
purpose of developing a unified strategy towards El Salvador. Core members agreed that Salvadorans in the
US were an important factor in
efforts to rebuild El Salvador after
that country's civil war. They also
agreed on the need for a unified
nation, an ideal which involved
reuniting hermanos ausentes ('distant
brothers') with their relatives at
home. Salvadorans are now the only
group of Central Americans with a
national organization to represent
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their interests in the US. To date,
efforts to develop a larger appeal
among Central American groups
have been unsuccessful.
DOMESTIC CONCERNS PREDOMINATE

While most Central Americans
claim that home-country issues are
important to them, their priority
remains the host society. As one
Nicaraguan leader in Miami put it,
"Nicaraguans look first at the stock
market in Wall Street rather than at
the inflation rate in their home
country." Among their priorities, US
Nicaraguans, Salvadorans and
Guatemalans list legal residency in
the US, decent employment, the
education and welfare of their children, and improving their position
in US society.
The attitude of Central American
nations and governments towards
emigrants is another factor in the
diaspora community's relationship
with the homeland. This attitude
varies from country to country. In
Nicaragua, where emigrants represent more than 20% of the total population, the Nicaraguan diaspora
passes relatively unnoticed at the official level. Popular opinion of emigrants is mixed; some are critical of
those who fought with Somoza and
helped create the contra forces, while
others are indifferent (despite the
fact that Nicaraguans abroad send
millions of dollars home in remittances). Residents of Managua refer
to returning 6migres as "Miami
boys," thus setting them apart from
the native population. In contrast,
the Salvadoran government regards
Salvadorans living in the US positively, with the understanding that citizens who left during the civil war are
helping to rebuild their country with
remittances and other material support. Finally, Guatemalans generally
display an attitude of ignorance and
indifference towards their countrymen abroad. This phenomenon is
partly explained by the disregard of
nonindigenous groups for the

indigenous population (which
accounts for the majority of
Guatemalan emigrants).
The cases of Nicaragua and
Guatemala suggest that the level of
political polarization in the home
country may help explain interest in
external mobilization among emigrants. In El Salvador, which has
experienced the least polarization
after its civil war, peaceful conditions
have provided an important incentive for returning 6migres.
Nicaragua, on the other hand,
remains polarized along the lines of
sandinismoversus somocismo. In
Guatemala, political splits have gradually diminished as the country
recovers from conflict. Guatemalan
organizations have shown an interest
in returning home, and long-term
exiles have visited the country to
show support for the peace process
and newly emerging civil society.
Perceptions of emigrants are also
affected by government outreach
efforts, or the lack thereof. Only El
Salvador has made an effort to link
Salvadorans living abroad to their
home country, through consular
campaigns designed to reach out to
hermanos ausentes. In neither
Nicaragua or Guatemala do such
efforts exist, although the local foreign affairs offices of these countries
have attempted to introduce similar
programs.
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE US: CREATING
SPACES FOR SUCCESSFUL INTEGRATION

The previous sections have identified five major points of discussion.
First, Central Americans are countryspecific when expressing their international interests. Second, although
Central American organizations with
links abroad address concerns similar
to those expressed by the US foreign
policy establishment, their activities
are not integrated into official US
policy. Third, Central American diaspora organizations are new, and are
only beginning to make their impact
felt. Fourth, Central Americans are

more concerned with US domestic
affairs than with their home countries. And fifth, factors such as continuing polarization of the home
country and attitudes towards emigrants contribute to the lack of international mobilization.
What implications do Central
American diaspora politics have for
the US? This question is particularly
relevant given the rising political and
economic power of Hispanics in the
US. By 2050, the Census Bureau predicts that the United States will be
52.8% white and 24.5% Hispanic.
The largest expansion of Hispanics
will take place in California, Florida,
Texas, New York and Illinois (all
swing states in US presidential elections). State forecasts for the year
2040 estimate that California's population will be almost 50% Hispanic
and 30% white. These demographic
changes have led scholars such as
Samuel Huntington and politicians
like Pat Buchanan to warn of a
"thirdworldization" of American
democracy that will undermine
Western liberal values.
The previous discussion of Central
Americans in the US reaches at least
two conclusions that contradict these
warnings. First, despite their international interests, Central Americans in
this country seem most interested in
becoming part of US society.
Second, Central Americans' interests
in their home countries are similar
to those of the US foreign policy
establishment, suggesting that immigrants have the potential indirectly to
further the US agenda abroad.
Immigrants do not represent a threat
to national unity and identity;
instead, given the growing number
of diaspora organizations, the US
should develop outreach programs
to facilitate their organized participation in domestic as well as international issues. Incentives to trust the
US government, as well as a policy of
partnership towards Central
America, are essential to this endeavor. U
Hemisphere . Volume Eight, Number Three

35

Features: Salvadorans

Lives at a Crossroads
Sarah Mahler

T

mosaic has a new and
important ingredient:
~he Unitedi States' ethnic
Salvadorans. The 1990
US census counted
565,000 Salvadorans in
this country, although some scholars
say the number is closer to one mil-

lion, equivalent to one-sixth of the
total population of El Salvador.
Even if we accept the lower figure,
Salvadorans are the fourth largest
Latino population in the US; if the
higher estimate is true, Salvadorans
may well surpass Cubans numerically
in the next census.
WARTIME EXODUS

Most Americans are not aware of
the growing presence of Salvadorans
in this country. The reasons are simple: Salvadorans are among the
most recent newcomers to the US,
are highly concentrated in a few
metropolitan areas, and tend to have
little economic and political clout.
According to the US Immigration
and Naturalization Service (INS),
fewer than 30,000 Salvadorans immigrated to the US prior to 1970. This
small group included diplomats and
students, as well as some workers
recruited to work as domestics and

in factories. During the 1970s, however, political and economic unrest
in El Salvador and severe government repression led thousands to

flee their homeland. Most migrants
headed for the US; by 1980, the
number of Salvadorans in this country had swollen to at least 100,000.
The greatest exodus occurred dur-

Sarah Mahler is associateprofessor of
sociologV/anthropology at Floida
InternationalUniversity.
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Hundreds of thousands of Salvadorans fled to the US in the 1980s, escaping the civil
war in their country. After a peace agreement marked the end of the conflict in

ing the years of the Salvadoran civil
war (1979-92), when over a half-million refugees streamed into the US.

Washington's Columbia Road and

Several hundred thousand more

and pupuseias (restaurants).

have arrived so far in the 1990s,
both legally and illegally.
Salvadorans are residentially concentrated. Nearly 50% live in

No large-scale national studies of
Salvadorans in the US exist to date;

Hempstead, Long Island-are
marked by Salvadoran storefronts

greater Los Angeles, 1 1% in New

in the meantime, census records
provide the best available data.
According to census figures, four

York, 9% in Washington, D.C., 8% in
San Francisco and 7% in Houston.
These concentrations are distinctive:
Washington is famous for its ties to a
region on El Salvador's east coast,
while the Long Island community is
made up mostly of peasants from
the eastern mountains. Los Angeles
attracts a larger cross-section of the
entire country. Ethnic neighborhoods-the Pico Union district of
downtown Los Angeles,

out of every five Salvadorans in the
US are foreign born. They are
equally divided between males and
females, and their median age in
1990 was 26, seven years younger
than the overall US population.
Two-thirds of adult Salvadorans have
not completed high school, and only
5% are college graduates. Not surprisingly, they work disproportionately in manufacturing and service
jobs, with only 6% in managerial or
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Salvadorans in the US

1992, many protested new immigration laws requiring their deportation to a homeland their children had never seen. Photo courtesy of Carecen-San Francisco.

professional occupations. Twentytwo percent of Salvadoran families
live below the poverty line, with a
per capita income of $7,200 (compared to a national average of
$14,420 in 1990). In short,
Salvadorans are a working poor population.
LEGAL QUAGMIRE

The Salvadoran civil war was notorious for the brutalities committed
against civilians. An estimated
75,000 people died, most at the
hands of the Salvadoran military.
Regardless, the US supported the
government with billions of dollars
in military and economic aid as part
of its Cold War containment strategy.
Because of this support, Salvadoran
refugees who made it to the US were

systematically denied political asylum
throughout the 1980s.
Owing to their undocumented status, Salvadorans were precluded
from many jobs and access to government services, pushing them
deeper into poverty. In the early
1990s, after a decade of court cases
filed against the INS by immigrant
advocacy organizations, Salvadorans
were offered temporary legal status
and work authorization for the duration of the war. Upon termination
of the temporary program (TPS),
they could apply for political asylum
under a revised asylum process.
Nationwide, some 187,000
Salvadorans applied for TPS; after
the program and several extensions
finally ended on September 30,
1995, many filed new asylum claims.

Unfortunately for Salvadorans, the
mid-1990s were a bad time to seek
favors from the INS. The US passed
new, highly restrictive immigration
legislation in 1996 that severely
altered the political asylum process.
Consequently, most new asylum cases
that came before the courts were
denied on the grounds that
Salvadorans had no compelling reason to stay in the US, given that the
civil war in their country ended in
1992. Migrant organizations countered that a whole generation of
Salvadorans had grown up in the US
and should not be deported to a
"homeland" they barely knew. Even
the Salvadoran government rallied to
the cause, arguing that the country
was in such a state of ruin from the
war that it could never absorb hundreds of thousands of return
migrants.
Three successive Salvadoran presidents and their diplomatic corps lobbied the US Congress to win permanent status for the migrants and, perhaps more important, to safeguard
the estimated $1.2 billion in remittances sent back to El Salvador each
year. This figure dwarfs other sources
of foreign currency and represents
11% of El Salvador's GNP. In June
1997, President Armando Calder6n
Sol retained a US law firm and lobbied key congressional figures, while
the Salvadoran Embassy embarked
on a public relations campaign to
improve the image of Salvadorans in
the US and to make Salvadoran
migrants themselves feel more warmly toward their national heritage.
The collective contributions of
grassroots and government lobbying
paid off, albeit modestly. In
November 1997, Congress passed the
Nicaraguan and Central American
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Relief Act, which offered full legal status to some 50,000 Nicaraguans and
relaxed "suspension of deportation"
standards for another 250,000
Salvadorans and Guatemalans. In
effect, the law allows Salvadorans who
meet certain eligibility requirements
to apply for legal status if they have
lived in the US a minimum of seven
years, display good "moral conduct,"
and can show that deportation would
cause them severe hardship. When
the new procedures take effect in late
1998, an estimated 150,000
Salvadorans and 200,000 of their relatives may ultimately benefit.
Salvadorans who arrived in the US
illegally after 1990, however, are
unlikely to find relief in this legislation.
THE CHALLENGES AHEAD

Even as they overcome significant
legal barriers, Salvadorans face an
array of challenges, not the least of
which is generating enough income
to support themselves and their families-both in this country and El
Salvador. A study by the Californiabased Tomis Rivera Policy Institute
found that Salvadorans spend about
10% of their income on remittances
to relatives, one of the highest proportions of the different migrant
groups studied. The impact of these
payments is so great that some 17%
of households in El Salvador depend
upon remittances for survival,
although this figure varies widely by
region. In one community studied by
the author, one-third of schoolchildren reported that their fathers lived
in the US; one-tenth said that their
mothers were in this country. Virtually all the students depended on
remittances to finance their studies.
Along with remittances have come
other, less welcome imports.
Thousands of Salvadoran gang members-primarily from Los Angeles
and Washington-have been deported back to El Salvador in recent
years, to a homeland many cannot
recall. In El Salvador, graffiti from
38 Hemisphere o Volume Eight, Number Three

Many Salvadorans in this country areforced to choose between living with precarious
legal status in the US or returning to a land where security and opportunity are as

reconstituted gangs adorns walls even
in small towns, and gang-related
crime is prevalent in the cities.
Although gangs contribute to the
postwar crime wave, decommissioned
soldiers deserve more blame. After
the war, many turned to thievery, targeting return migrants in particular.
Present murder rates are equal to or
exceed those experienced during the
war. These conditions frighten many
Salvadoran migrants, particularly
women, and discourage them from
returning. Many people are forced
to choose between living with precarious legal status in the US or returning to a land where security and
opportunity are as scarce as they were
during the civil war.
TRANSNATIONAL LIVES

Remittances and gangs are only a
few aspects of the transnationalization of Salvadoran life. In an age of
telecommunications and transportation advances, many migrant groups
actively maintain a variety of links to
their countries of origin. Salvadorans

are no exception; flows of people,
money and information knit together
El Salvador and the US on multiple
levels, from kinship and diplomacy to
international trade. Some observers
have argued that mass migration has
transformed Salvadoran society more
than the civil war that provoked the
migration in the first place.
Transnational relations have also
opened up entrepreneurial niches,
such as those occupied by international couriers-people who earn
their living flying between countries
carrying letters, remittances, videos
and Salvadoran delicacies.
Increasingly, Salvadorans are forming
hometown associations that raise
money in the US to fund projects in
their communities of origin. Other
groups, such as the Salvadoran
American National Network (SANN),
address the common needs of all
Salvadorans resident in the US.
SANN is also cultivating relations with
the Salvadoran diplomatic corps as
well as organizations within El
Salvador, so that important issues
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scarce as they were during the civil war. Return migrants are the frequent victims of
escalating crime in El Salvador: Photo courtesy of Carecen-San Francisco.

affecting all Salvadorans can be
addressed transnationally.
THE HUMAN DIMENSION

Salvadorans have traveled a rough
road, and have much to celebrate
during the September 15 independence day parades they hold in many
US cities. They also have a long road
ahead of them and many roadblocks
to overcome. Theirs is a majority
working poor population; immigration status for many is still tenuous,
and they face raising children in
some of the most depressed areas of
the US. It is a reality that can best be
captured by a personal vignette.
Yolanda Pacheco (a pseudonym)
came to the US in the late 1980s during the height of urban fighting in El
Salvador's capital city, San Salvador.
Her husband, Edgar, witnessed
numerous massacres and was in constant danger of forced recruitment
into the military. Yolanda never knew
if Edgar would make it home from
work in the evening, a fact that frayed
their nerves to the breaking point.

When they fled the country Yolanda
was so frightened of the trip overland-particularly through Mexico,
where many Central Americans on
their way north are stripped,
searched and raped-that she left
her young son in the care of a neighbor.
Upon arrival in the US, Yolanda
became a nanny for a middle-class
Long Island family, while Edgar
found work as a pool maintenance
laborer. It pained Yolanda to spend
her days caring for another family's
children when she had no idea how
her own son was being treated. Her
employers agreed to sponsor her for
legal residency in 1990, but by 1998
her residency interview had still not
been scheduled, owing to a huge
backlog in these types of applications.
In the interim, Yolanda and Edgar
applied for TPS and obtained work
permits. In 1991 they paid for their
son, accompanied by Yolanda's brother, to attempt his own undocumented
crossing into the US. For two anxious months they heard nothing;

finally, the pair arrived across the border, but the smugglers who called
Yolanda would not let her speak to
them. She borrowed huge sums of
money and flew to Texas to find her
family. Unfortunately, the new
arrivals were too late to qualify for
TPS.
In 1992 Yolanda gave birth to her
second son, a US citizen. As he grew
up, the family remained divided by
immigration status. In 1997, Yolanda
began to feel herself weakening and
suffered occasional trembling in her
muscles. She has no medical insurance, so she went to a local clinic and
was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis.
The doctors would like to treat her
with a new, aggressive drug therapy,
but Yolanda cannot afford the medication. She dares not apply for government assistance or Medicaid,
because it could jeopardize her application for legal residency-applicants
deemed likely to become "public
charges" are often rejected. So she
takes a series of vitamins each day,
has cut back on her work schedule,
and hopes that a solution will present
itself by the end of the year.
In the decade since her arrival in
the US, Yolanda no longer fears the
violence and repression that drove
her from her homeland, but her life
is nonetheless a difficult balancing
act. Her future, and that of her family, is at the mercy of forces largely
outside her control. Her situation is
not unique; many Salvadorans in the
US would identify with her predicament. Most express profound longing for the lives they lived in El
Salvador prior to the war, especially
the closeness of their family ties and
community events that punctuated
the routine of everyday life. But at
the same time that they wax nostalgic,
they are grateful to find a degree of
safe haven from El Salvador's troubles in the US. Despite past and present hardships they have faced in this
country, most find hope in the
prospect that their children's futures
will be brighter. U
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Bridging the Ideological Divide

On

Manny Hidalgo

a recent balmy

evening in Miami
Beach, hundreds of
people gathered for
a concert by a visiting
musician from Cuba.
Issac Delgado played his vibrant
salsa rhythms to a packed house at
the Onyx night club and in one
night shattered the ice that has kept
so many other Cuban musicians
from performing in the city with the
largest Cuban population outside of
the island. Less than two years ago,
Miami fans attending a similar concert by a Cuban jazz pianist were the
targets of rocks and eggs thrown by
angry Cuban-American protesters.
Other events were routinely canceled after bomb threats were
phoned in or Molotov cocktails were
hurled through windows in protest.
Not a single protest occurred at
Delgado's concert. The crowd of
young expatriates danced as if they
were dancing for the first time since
leaving Cuba. After the first song, a
medley of popular salsa tunes from
Cuba and the US, Delgado summarized this historic breakthrough by
saying, "Here or in Cuba, we are all
part of the same family-we are all
Cubans!"
Another landmark event
occurred in Cuba itself earlier this
year. Cuban dissidents and their
families listened in shock and

delight as Pope John Paul II, making

Manny Hidalgo is a graduatestudent in
Latin American and Caribbeanstudies at
FloridaInternationalUniversity. He is a

a historic visit to the island, criticized the denial of basic freedoms
for Cuban citizens. The commander
of the Cuban military, Fidel Castro's
brother Ra6l, sat uneasily during the
mass, an unimaginable event several
years earlier when Catholics could
not join the Cuban Communist
Party and the state was officially
atheist.
After decades of mutual hostility,
the Cuban government and the
Cuban exile community appear to
be engaged in a genuine process of
ideological and social change. Too
many significant social interactions
are taking place between the exile
community and island residents to
be dismissed as insignificant. As
Damiin Fernindez argues, it is pre-

cisely at this level of "lo informal"
where the "politics of passionpolitics construed as a moral imperative for absolute ends-and the politics of affection-politics based on
an instrumental logic justified by
who you know and who you lovecombine to subvert the institutions
of modern nation states as they sow
incivility in social and political
relations." This article takes
Fernandez's statement a step further, arguing that the social interactions taking place between Cuba and
the exile community are indicative
of an evolving relationship between
sub-elite sectors across the ideological divide. This interaction may
help resolve the ongoing conflict
between intransigent elites in Cuba
and Miami whose values are no
longer congruent with popular values and expectations.

founding member of Cubans and Americans for EducationalExchange (CAFE),
an organization thatpromotes international student exchange with Cuba.
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THE POLITICS OF PASSION

The most famous example of the
standoff between dominant elites in

Cuba and the Cuban-American
community, and one which degenerated into an almost personal feud,
involved the animosity between
Fidel Castro and the recently
deceased founder of the Cuban
American National Foundation
(CANF), Jorge Mas Canosa. In

1994, The New Republic published an
article that described Mas Canosa,
son of an officer in Fulgencio
Batista's army, as the caudillo of
Miami. The article was the subject
of a successful lawsuit by Mas
Canosa, who objected to the use of
the word "mobster"in the title;
however, it convincingly chronicled
the Cuban-American leader's
attempts to ruin or discredit others
who opposed his strategy of forcing
Cuba into economic, political and
social collapse. To further this goal,
Mas Canosa built a vast network of
political allies in Miami,
Washington, D.C. and other politically important cities. Among the
politicians The New Republic charged
with benefiting from Mas-controlled
contributions were, from Florida,
Representatives Ileana Ros-Lehtinen
and Lincoln Diaz Balart, Senator
Connie Mack and Governor Lawton
Chiles; from New Jersey,
Representative Robert Menendez
and Senator Robert Torricelli; and
Senator Ernest Hollings of South
Carolina. Mas Canosa was able to
penetrate the inner circle of the
Clinton administration and secured
de facto control of Radio and TV
Marti, as well as the right to control
who in the Cuban-American community would gain access to the
White House. When the president
convened a meeting in Washington
to discuss changes in US policy
towards Cuba after the balsero crisis
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Forcesfor reconciliation in the Cuban and Cuban-American communities

Monument to the Cuban rafters, Little Havana, Miami, Florida. A growing number of Cubans and Cuban-Americans are more
interested in pragmatic and constructive dialogue and exchange than in the divisive politics of the last 39 years, responsiblefor

such tragedies as the sinking of boatloads of exiles fleeing the island.

of 1994, the gathering included
only those exiles who endorsed the
CANF party line. This occurred
despite a poll taken by The conomins/
in July 1994, which found that four
out of five Cuban-Americans in
Dade County favored "negotiations
with the Cuban government to facil-

itate peaceful change.- When
Clinton's special advisor on Cuban
affairs, Richard Nuccio, convened a
follow-up meeting in Miami, only
CANF-approved guests were invited.
Fidel Castro responded to \las
Canosa with his own verbal attacks
and by routinely excluding the

CANF from any attempts at dialogue with the Cuhan government.
More important tihan his hatwed for
Mas Canosa

and

the CANF, howev-

er, is his coutinuied persecution of
residents of Cuba who have struggled to open nore space for an
independent civil society, especially
Hemisphere * Volume Eight, Number Three
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in both the Cuban and Cuban-

American communities to the point
that it began to alienate more moderate groups and individuals. In
the last few years, this alienation
has led to the emergence of subelite sectors in Cuba and Miami
that pose a real challenge to the 39year-old status quo. The recent

activities of these groups indicate
that growing numbers of Cubans
and Cuban-Americans are more
interested in pragmatic and constructive dialogue and exchange
than in divisive and essentially
destructive politics. Such politics,
critics argue, have sunk more than

I41
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emotions in both Cuba and Miami
ran high.
The Cuban government responded to the passage of the HelmsBurton Act by cracking down on
members of Cuba's civil society it
deemed counterrevolutionary. The
targets of this repression included
certain NGOs, such as the

transition in the Cuban exile com-

Washington-based Pax World
Service, and the Center for the
Study of the Americas (CEA) in
Havana. Many of the CEA intellectuals were dispersed to other academic organizations, and a general
freeze ensued on the study of the
internal Cuban economic, political
and social struggle.

munity came immediately after the
pope's visit to Cuba, when the
CANF experienced a falling-out
with its congressional supporters.
The controversy developed when
the CANF's new executive director,
Jose "Pepe" Hernandez, declared
the organization's support for a bill
drafted by Senator Jesse Helms to
send humanitarian assistance to
Cuba through the Cuban Catholic
Church. The CANF was attempting
to discredit the Castro regime by

Children at the Lenin Monument, Cuba. The pope's recent visit to Cuba and his public criticism of the Castro regime was but one indication of a more open attitude
towards dialogue and negotiation in Cuban society.

since the collapse of the Soviet
Union in 1989. The Castro regime
has repeatedly jailed Cuban human
rights dissidents, accusing intellectuals and artists of collaborating

with forces in the US to weaken
and/or topple the Cuban
Revolution. The most famous dissident roundup occurred in the
weeks preceding a February 1996
conference organized by Concilio
Cubano, a new umbrella coalition
of human rights groups. The coalition announced its plans to meet
well in advance and asked official
permission from the government to
hold the conference. And yet, most
of the conference leaders were
arrested and sentenced to 14
months in prison for contempt of

authority.
On the day the conference was
supposed to convene, Cuban forces
shot down three small Cessnas piloted by members of Brothers to the
Rescue, a nonviolent resistance
group in Miami led by Mas Canosa
ally Jose Bastlto. Three CubanAmericans and one expatriate
42
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million Cubans into economic

misery and left 1.5 million CubanAmericans disillusioned and frustrated. Cynics have even proposed
the classic conspiracy theory that
the ideological divide has been artificially maintained para la gente que
vine del cuento-by those who have
found a way to benefit from the
continued state of polarized relations. The very fact that this type
of direct criticism is growing among
people in both communities supports Anthony Maingot's assertion
that "there is no ignoring that
today the truly dynamic society
which is taking shape, contrary to
the wishes of both leaderships, is
the social interaction (which is
what makes society) between the
exile community and the island residents."
Perhaps the best example of elite

Cuban were killed. The incident
touched off a firestorm of protests
in Miami and the passage in
Washington of the Helms-Burton
Act, which tightened and codified
the US embargo towards Cuba.
Moderates went into hibernation as

THE POLITICS OF PRAGMATISM

Such instances of repression reinforced the intransigent elite stance

Features: Cubans and Cuban-Americans

offering support that Cuba would
have to refuse due to its political
implications.
As anticipated, Castro immediately dismissed the offer as "repugnantly cynical." In a surprise twist,
former CANF congressional stalwarts Ros-Lehtinen, Diaz Balart and
Menendez also rejected the proposal and refused to endorse or sponsor it in Congress. That the CANF
would advance legislation without
the unconditional support of the
only three Cuban-American members of Congress was unprecedented. Hernindez was publicly livid
and the elite guard in Miami began
showing signs of internal discord.
While CANF elites battled with
their erstwhile allies in Congress,
another organization emerged to
fill the vacuum. The Cuban
Committee for Democracy (CCD)
was founded in 1993 and describes
itself as a nonprofit organization
seeking "a peaceful, negotiated
transition to democracy in Cuba."

On March 31, 1998, 160 CCDaffiliated Cuban-Americans from
Miami and their non-Cuban
American allies flew to Washington,
D.C. on a chartered plane to participate in a National Day of Advocacy
and Education on Cuba. The delegation was received by Senator
Christopher Dodd and
Congressman Esteban Torres, who
have sponsored the Senate and
House versions of bills intended to
lift restrictions on the sale of food
and medicine to the island. This
meeting marked a new milestone in
the relationship between moderate
sub-elite Cuban-Americans and governing elites in Washington. For
the first time in Cuban exile political history, a group of moderate
political sub-elites led by the CCD
had emerged to represent the views
of moderate Cuban-Americans in
Miami. These demands were cap-

tured by a 1997 poll conducted by
Florida International University's
Institute for Public Opinion

Research, which revealed that 56%
of Cubans in Miami favored allowing US companies to sell medicine
to Cuba. Another 44% supported
food sales to the island, while 52%
favored "establishing a national dialogue among Cuban exiles, Cuban
dissidents, and representatives of
the Cuban government."
Along with various other organizations, including Cambio Cubano,
Christian Democrats, Radio
Transici6n and Radio Progreso, the
CCD has attempted to establish a
dialogue with Cuba to achieve a
peaceful transition to democracy
on the island. These efforts have
met with great enthusiasm from the
Vatican, the Cuban Conference of
Bishops and at least 135 members
of the US Congress who support
the Dodd-Torres bill. These efforts
coincide with the easing of restrictions on travel and cash remittances to Cuba and permission for
US pharmaceutical and medical
equipment companies to sell their
products there.
Perhaps the biggest surprise was
Fidel Castro's generally positive and
conciliatory reaction to these overtures, which came in stark contrast
to the views expressed by the three
Cuban-American congressional representatives, the CANF and
Brothers to the Rescue. Their
views were best expressed by
Ninoska Perez-Castell6n, a CANF
director, who said in a radio interview that the administration's
moves were prompted by "a collusion of characters-fakes and
opportunists who want to do business with Cuba."
A poll conducted by Univisi6n's
Miami affiliate on the evening after
the US policy changes were
announced revealed that out of
22,000 callers, 68% agreed with the
president's actions. The gap
between the Cuban-American elite
in favor of the US embargo towards
Cuba and the sub-elite sector in
favor of normalizing relations and

pursuing a peaceful transition to
democracy through dialogue was
clearly widening.
FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE

Scholars have expressed some
concern about future generations
of moderate elite leaders in the
Cuban-American community.
Second-generation CubanAmericans have been raised in a
political culture quite distinct from
that of their parents, and many are
"burned out" on the topic of Cuba,
which is discussed ad nauseam in
their households. Ruben Rumbaut
predicts that a "post-exile CubanAmerican generation will see itself
mostly and natively as American,
with or without the hyphen, and
that (they) will see Cuba nostalgically as origin but not as destiny, as
the past and wished-for future of
their criollo parents-but not as
their own." Yet, recent data show
that the second generation is eager
to pursue a dialogue with Cuba. A
1997 Cuba Poll conducted by the
Institute of Public Opinion
Research at Florida International
University revealed that CubanAmericans born in the US were
more open to dialogue and ending
the US embargo than any other
group polled. They were also the
group most in favor of playing contemporary music from the island
on Miami radio stations and allowing Cuban musicians to perfom in

the US.
Taking this data into consideration, it is plausible to conclude that
new generations of sub-elites in
Cuba and Miami may succeed in
finding the common ground that
eluded the majority of their parents. It will be in this context that
a new relationship between Cubans
and Cuban-Americans will be built
and nurtured in a spirit of peace
and reconciliation. Such are the
hopes and aspirations of millions of
Cubans and Cuban-Americans
across the ideological divide. U
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Lengua Franca
Teresa Palomo Acosta

Las girls van de compras para gourmet food

Lipstick numero tres*

It's Irene who first tells me
to check out the canned tripas
or was it canned menudo? In the aisles of
el supermercado.

Time to let my lips be plain and clean.
Say they're mine to do with what I want,
which is to leave them alone, beginning now.
Time to let my labios rest
in their light mud brown
and gentle pinkish wrinkles.
Time to end the six dollars
and ninety-five cents bargain deals
in which I've invested
from my fourteenth year,
mas o menos, until now.
Time to eat the food I want
and drink the water I need
without requiring
the holy pencil to rake itself
for the umpteenth time
over my lips, which are trying
to tell truths these days.
Yes they are.
My Pesina, Palomo, Alderete, Acosta
labios.
So deliciously and plainly bold.

Y de volada I call las girlswho are game. Once in the tiendota,
they run ahead of me,
duck down the "Spanish" food aisle.
Faint olores of comino y ajo in cellophane wrappers
arise from neatly stocked shelves.
Reaching for cans of tripas y jalapenos en sauce,
we throw them, one after the other,
into our supermercado shopping cart.
De volada, as if we were in a concurso
for premios for more cans of comida mexicana
stacked in a shopping cart in under five minutes.
Al fin del cuento
la cart parece un piramide anciano
but without
las explosiones del olor
of home cooking the arroz y fideo.

*This poem is part of a series offour related works.

No, these are merely botes full of chismes
Without a reason for being,
except for dinero para los conglomerates,
except for time to waste
in the post modern vida Chicana
that las girls endure every day.

Teresa PalomoAcosta was born and raised in McGregor; Texas. She received a B.A. in ethnic studies from the University of Texas at
Austin and an M.S. in journalismfrom Columbia University. Herpoetry and short stories have appeared in print since 1976 and have
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Spell my name
My name is Cristina Lopez Gonzalez.
That's Cristina without the h
and Gonzalez with a z.
(Here a shrug.)
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A dazzling collection of poetry that
brings together major Latina literary

figures with intriguing new voices

Yo me llamo Josefina Paulette Gomez
and there's an accent mark
on the o in Gomez
but we don't use it.
(Here a smile and a tilt of the head towards me.)
I'm Pedro. Last name Rodriguez-which is w-aaay
too largo for me. But I'll give it a try.
(Here a concentrated frown, pencil midair.)
I'm Nico-well Nicolas;
that's the English way of saying it
and the Spanish way of spelling.
(Here a broad grin.)

fcQc$§Y @ '(

Question, Nico: Do you like it that way?
Answer: well, yeah.
My 'buela insists on the Spanish version.
Question, Nico: What do you like?
(Here a shrug and a "both.")
I mind my 'buela. If she says it in Spanish,
I say it's a-ok with me.
(Here a spontaneous "Nicolis,"
como en Spanish.)
Here
the mark of Tex-Mex is
on every tongue/lengua franca.
Y no importa que digan los jefes,
who bend over the Spanish
dictionary, counting every missed syllable.

fir

A COLLECTION OF LATINA POETRY

;Floricanto Si! presents poems from forty-seven Latina writers

from all over the U.S. with roots throughout Latin America.
These women have contributed to a remarkable, first-of-itskind volume, one that interprets America, art and love in
vibrant new ways.
"A mesmerizing, haunting and celebratory collection."
-Marjorie Agosin
"A rich collection of poems of great range and power."
-Dallas Morning News

IN

BOOKSTORES NOW
www.penguinputnam.com

A Penguin Book

(
IN BOOKSTORES

NOW

won numerous awards. She has taught Chicana studies at the University of Texas at Austin and currently serves as a literacy tutorfor
Spanish-dominantfirst- and second-gradersin Austin, Texas.
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Life on the Margins
JanetJarman

T

exceeded 100 degrees
as the sun pierced the
earth. A fierce breeze
lifted dust from hundreds of unpaved
roads in Matamoros, a rapidly
expanding city on the US-Mexican
border. These inferno-like conditions hardly deterred the several
dozen families working in the
municipal dump, who resisted the
stench and heat. Among them
were Eloisa Fernandez, 39, and
three of her nine children.
Together, they and other families
sifted through the city's waste
searching for recyclable items to

he temperature

use and sell.

Eloisa and her children lived one
kilometer from the dump. Each
day they worked there, seeking
food for their livestock, clothing to
reuse, glass and cans to resell.
Each month, Eloisa awaited a
check from her husband, Vinicio,
who worked as a migrant farm

worker in the United States with
their eldest son, Juan. One day, "I
hope we all can live together and
find a better life in the United
States," she said.
Four months later, in December
1996, Eloisa's dream became reality. Vinicio returned to Matamoros
to rest between harvest seasons. In
mid-December, he received news

JanetJarman is a freelance photojournalist based in London. She specializes
in environmental and Latin American

issues and can be reached via e-mail at
jjarman@gn.apc.org. This photo essay
is part of an ongoing project documenting the lives of migrantfamilies in the
US. The names used are pseudonyms.
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that one of his former field bosses
had enough work for the whole
family on a strawberry farm near
Tampa, Florida.
Vinicio had always wanted to
bring his family to the US, but the
risks and costs had seemed too
high. Although he had a legal US
residence card and work permit,
and the two youngest children, who
were born on the US side of the
border, qualified as US citizens, residence petitions for Eloisa and the
other children were still pending.

They would be at the mercy of US
border officials if they tried to

cross. "They can make up any reason not to let you through," Vinicio
explained. "The ones you really
have to watch out for are the
Mexican agents hired by the US
government. They're the ones who
will stab you in the back," he said.
Despite these obstacles,
December seemed like an opportune time to make a move, especially since the family had guaranteed work untilJune. Juan and his
father worked quickly to prepare
their 1977 van for the two-day journey to Florida.
Family members packed few personal belongings to avoid looking
conspicuous at the border. Many
Matamoros residents are permitted
to enter the US to shop inside a 25mile radius, but US patrols are
quick to interrogate drivers of overcrowded and other suspect vehicles. The family also had to pass
through a second, more difficult
immigration station outside this
radius. For this, they waited until
10 p.m., when they knew there
would be a border patrol shift
change. It is rumored that officials
are less vigilant during this

WORKING. August 1996, Matamoros.
Marisol, 9, helps her mother, Eloisa,
sort through garbage deposited in the
Matamoros municipal dump. Approximately 50 families work in the dump,
collecting metal, cans and other recyclable and reusable items. Sharp
objects, disease vectors, fires and smoke
are among the hazards they face working there.
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PRAYING. August 1996, Matamoros.
During a prayerservice in the dump,
Wisconsin residents visiting a Texasbased ministry prayfor Eloisa. At the
time, she suffered severe stomach pains
and headaches.
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MARISOL. August 1996, Matamoros. Portrait of Marisol at dusk as she and family members wait for another rubbish load.

changeover; in this case, at least,
the theory proved true. The family
crossed the checkpoint successfully
and continued driving for 36 hours
to reach Florida. There, they
began etching a new life for themselves in the state's agricultural
heartland.
Upon first impressions, the family appeared to be much better off
in its new surroundings. Many
other Mexicans had settled in the
area, from Matamoros and from as
far away as Guadalajara and
Oaxaca. Vinicio's cousin and his
family lived nearby in another trailer, providing a convenient social
and family support network. A
nearby community church supplied
48 Hemisphere
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them with clothing and other
household items, and the children
began to attend American schools
and to learn English.
At the same time, however, the
small three-room trailer they rented was too cramped for a family of
11. At night, they heard rats running between the walls. Eloisa and
her children felt isolated and
homesick for Mexico. Financially,
they could barely break even due
to the higher cost of living in the
US. Monthly rent came to $500.
Weekly food bills averaged $150.
During a good week, they could
gross $800 with five family members working, leaving little opportunity for savings.

Financial tension and limited
work during the summer began
dividing the family. At one point,
Eloisa nearly returned to Mexico,
threatening to take the children
with her. Eventually, family members reached a compromise; they
moved to a small town in Texas,
where Eloisa has sisters. They have
remained there for the last year.
Despite numerous difficulties,
mostly related to limited resources,
Vinicio and Eloisa are grateful that
the whole family is together, finally,
in a country where they can find
work. "We struggled enough in
Mexico," Eloisa said, referring over
and over again to "el dolor" (literally, "the pain," or anguish) she

Photo Essay: Life on the Margins

experienced trying to survive in
Matamoros.
Contrary to the stereotypes many
Americans hold of illegal aliens
who cost US taxpayers billions of
dollars in social services, Vinicio
and his family are proud not to tap
into the various government handouts available to them. Vinicio
cites abundant work opportunities
in the US as the primary reason for
moving and is certain that his family's situation can improve little by
little in this country. "If we keep
working together like this, one day
we can have something," he once
said in Florida. "We could save
enough money to build a house
out of bloque (cinderblocks or other
permanent material) in Mexico."
After one year in the US, the
family now rents such a house in
Texas. Their next goal is to purchase the home for $35,000. This
dream may take more time.
Currently, both Vinicio and Eloisa
work nights earning between $5.20
and $5.70 an hour. Eloisa washes
dishes in a local restaurant, and
Vinicio works at a local chain store
unloading boxes from 10 p.m. to
dawn. Just recently, they discussed
moving to Oklahoma or back to
Florida, where they could earn
higher wages. This would mean
uprooting the children for a third
time, threatening their progress in
school and their friendships in the
Texas town.
Despite the modest progress they
have made rebuilding their lives in
the US, the Fernindez family continues to live a transient existence.
For them and hundreds of other
Mexican families who have crossed
the border into the US, the only
certainty remains uncertainty.

COMFORT. August 1996, Matamoros. Marisol fans her four-month-old sister on a
hot summer day when the temperature in Matamoros exceeded 100 degrees.
Hemisphere o Volume Eight, Number Three

49

Photo Essay: Life on the Margins

CANDLE. August 1996, Matamoros. Nancifinishes her homework by candlelight.
Although city officials installed poles in 1995, cables to carry electricity had not yet
arrived a year later
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BATH. August 1996, Matamoros. Kristina and her sisters, Eloisa and Marisol (left to right), bathe outside the home theirfamily
built in Colonia de Cambio, close to the municipal dump. Through a hose, they access piped water near their home. The supply is
erratic and of poor quality, often forcing them to buy drinking waterfrom private vendors.
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CHURCH. August 1996, Matamoros.
Marisol daydreams during Sunday
school while the teacher warns the chil-

dren that if they do notfollow God,
they will end up like delinquents in the
US, who bring guns to school and disrespect their parents.

"

A
EXHAUSTION. January 1997, Florida. Eloisa appears exhausted after working in
thefields all day. Although agricultural labor was "cleaner"than the dump, the work
was physically much harder, she said. For thefirst few weeks, she suffered painful skin
rashes on herface from the pesticides used on the plants. In addition to picking strawberries, Eloisa has worked assembly jobs manufacturing sports clothing and as a dishwasher in two Texas restaurants.
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STRAWBERRIES. January1997, Florida. Vinicio, 43, picks strawberriesduring a rare winterfreeze in Florida. Strawberries
are one of the highest-value cropsforfarmers, but also one of the most fragile. Migrants call them 'frutas del diablo" (devil's
fruit), since picking them is one of the lowest paid and most labor-intensivejobs. Workers must bend at the waistfor hours and
concentrate on picking berries only of a certain size, firmness, shape and color The fruit is then arrangedneatly into baskets to
attractthe shopper's eye.
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FASHION. January 1997, Florida. Sandra, 17, seemed pleased as she and other family members tried on American clothing donated
to them by a local church. Such happy moments were few, however; among her siblings, Sandrasuffered most after moving. Once
very religious and a promising student in Matamoros, Sandra ceased attending church and school upon arriving in the US. Almost
immediately, her role shifted to primary caretakerand cook, while her parents labored in the fields and her younger siblings attended
American schools. Her situation worsened after the move to Texas, leading her for a time to contemplate suicide. In an attempt to

separateherselffrom herfamily completely, Sandra recently moved in with her boyfriend, Hugo. The couple expect a child in
November
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RUN. January 1997, Florida. Kristina, Marisol and Pedro race through the yard surroundingtheir trailerhome in Florida, where
they had much more space to play than in Mexico. The ground was soft and sandy, instead of the mud and broken glass that surrounded their home near the dump in Matamoros.
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AMERICAN SCHOOL/FIRST DAY
January 1997, Florida. Marisol waits
outside with other classmates on her
first day of school in the United States.
She and siblings Pedro and Kristina
seemed nervous yet excited on this day.
This particular school in Florida caters
to migrant children.
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BUS/FIRST DAY OF SCHOOL. January 1997, Florida. On the way to school, children observe their new classmate.
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BUBBLES. June 1998, Texas. In front of their house, Kristina (left) and Eloisa Fernandez discover bubble blowing with soap given
to them by a neighbor:
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Identity Crisis
M. Karen Bracken

Strangers Among Us: How Latino
Immigration Is Transforming
America
by Roberto Suro
New York: Knopf, 1998. 349 pages.

,

$18.87
till reeling from the civil
rights movement's efforts
to end the separate and
unequal structure of its
race and class system, the
United States is in grave
danger of repeating the same mistakes with a new segment of the
population: the Latino immigrants
of the post-segregation era. The
social, political and economic challenges arising from immigration
have sparked a national identity crisis and pose a new litmus test for
democracy. So argues journalist
Roberto Suro, currently with The
Washington Post. Suro sets out to
demonstrate the effects of this crisis
on natives and newcomers alike,
and proposes some well-reasoned
steps to alleviate it. To make his
case he takes the reader on a tour of
Latino neighborhoods across the
country for a nuanced examination
of the condition and context of the
"strangers among us.One of the lasting impressions of
this tour is the great diversity of the
Latino population, a fact well known
to scholars and those who have tried
to deal with or organize Latinos as
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America and the Caribbean.
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though they comprised a monolithic
entity bound by common culture.
This diversity is less familiar to
Americans who rely on shadowy
stereotypes or their experience with
one local piece of the vast mosaic.
Taken individually, the barrios present a gamut of apparent successes
and failures for their occupants.
Taken together, Suro proposes, they
present evidence for great concern.
New York's Puerto Rican barrio,
for example, never recovered from
the drastic loss of manufacturing
jobs that went south, and remai s
mired in social disintegration, wlfare dependency and despair. nd
while the city's Dominican barrio
may be full of infectious energy and
rhythms, it is infected by a dependence on drug trafficking and fly-bynight businesses. Los Angeles teems
with eager, low-skilled "enablers"
who cluster conspicuously in curbside labor markets to compete for
informal jobs at minimum wage, or
arrive inconspicuously at the homes,
restaurants, office buildings and car
washes of the wealthy. If these
floaters are lucky they will land a
permanent low-paying job, join the
ranks of the working poor and move
to a bungalow in gang-plagued East
L.A. Likewise, Houston's Hispanic
neighborhoods house a cheerful
army of Mexicans and Central
Americans who will bag your groceries and sweep your floors, and
thank you for the opportunity to do
so. Miami is the exception, a showcase immigrant barrio that encompasses an entire county, serves as
broker for the circum-Caribbean
and rivals the Anglo population for
high-income households.
While Suro's accounts add to our
understanding of the differences
among barrios, his real purpose is to
suggest a commonality. From South
Central to Washington Heights,
immigrant neighborhoods may
become permanent fixtures of the
urban landscape rather than transitional zones. Suro, the son of
60 Hemisphere " Volume Eight, Number Three

Puerto Rican and Ecuadorian parents, acknowledges that many
Latinos never enter the barrio.
Others achieve the social mobility to
leave it, like other ethnic groups
before them. But the extensive
Latino barrios stand apart from the
surrounding society, and conditions
may dictate that they become traps,
not ports of entry. This situation is
both self-imposed by those with a
sojourner mentality and structurally
imposed by economic changes in
this country. For the outsider, the
barrio denotes otherness, as
enclaves always have, while for the
insider, it may demarcate how far
one can penetrate American society.
Some comparisons can be drawn
with the squatter settlements of
most Latin American cities; no matter how crucial the goods and services they provide, no matter how
entwined in interactions with other
urban dwellers, residents of these
areas are somehow always deemed
"marginal," and must fight tooth
and claw to extract resources from
the powers that be.
Since the 1960s, the mechanisms
for leaving the barrio have eroded
and the urgency to do so has been
tempered by transnationality. Suro's
concern is that many Latino immigrants, for all of their dynamism and
high hopes, will be unable to contribute their best to our nation or
receive the best that it has to offer.
They are begrudgingly allowed into
the country, only to be denied full
benefits once they are here.
Public sentiment about immigration waxes and wanes with precipitating events and is closely and
inversely correlated with economic
swings at the local and national levels. And yet, even in good times
there is widespread resentment over
the profound demographic transformation of this country. The targets
of such resentment are most often
Latinos, who are more likely to be
located at the bottom of the "hourglass" profile of current immigra-

tion trends. This image suggests a
polarized pattern of highly educated
and skilled immigrants at the top,
with minimally educated and lessskilled immigrants at the bottom. It
is very difficult for those at the bottom to squeeze their way upward
through the narrow waist of the
hourglass.
Suro contends that the generational social mobility experienced by
the last great wave of immigrants to
this country-embodied in the
process "peddler to plumber to professional"-is no longer a viable
assumption for many new arrivals.
The steppingstone blue-collar jobs
barely exist, and a good education is
more important than ever for
achieving the American Dream.
The children of Latino immigrants
are falling through the cracks, as
evidenced by their high dropout
rate and the alienation they express.
Suro's interviews reveal a generation
crippled by frustration, alternately
angry and distraught at the prospect
of social rejection. Past and current
efforts to integrate immigrants and
their offspring, to bring them out of
the barrio and into the national
community, have been confused at
best. At worst, such individuals are
being prepared for second-class citizenry.
While many adult immigrants can
favorably compare low-status jobs
and low wages in the US with what
they left behind, or choose to defer
material comforts in this country to
send remittances back home, their
children have a different frame of
reference. They are Americans, confronted with questions of class, race
and identity which their elders are
willing to ignore. They are not
going back home; they are home,
with all of the expectations that this
magnet country produces but few of
the tools to realize them. Our challenge as a nation is to prepare them
for productive, fulfilling roles in this
society, despite our resistance to
view them as peers.
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While some observers might
attribute resentment of poor Latino
immigrants to racism, bigotry and
xenophobia, Suro considers such
emotions to be effects rather than
causes. Some of the US public's
anxiety stems from real or perceived
competition. African-Americans are
especially concerned about losing
newly won ground to the traditional
and degrading pattern of ethnic succession. They are frightened of
being eclipsed by the sheer numbers
of new minorities and by the "comfort factor" that causes the mainstream to prefer dealing with new
groups that lack the historical baggage of black Americans. In contrast, whites who express antiimmigrant sentiments worry that
national borders have become irrelevant, that the government has lost
control or devotes all its resources to
special interest groups, and that the

average Joe must foot the bill for
millions of illegal immigrants with
few prospects, high fertility rates,
urgent needs, a disregard for the law
and allegiance to some distant
nation. These critics argue that low
levels of language acquisition and
naturalization rates among Latinos
are proof that they are not committed to a future in this country, and
so do not deserve valuable government resources. Frustration and
anger often blur the distinctions
between legal and illegal, employed
and unemployed, assets and liabilities, the short term and the long
term. Suro concludes that we can
bring these distinctions back into
focus by dealing seriously and systematically with illegal immigration.
The book's concluding chapters
offer a number of logical suggestions for taking back the border.
Suro addresses his arguments to

groups he feels wrongly aid and abet
illegal immigration. He takes the
bold move of asking US Latinos to
reconsider their advocacy of illegal
aliens, arguing that the backlash has
extended to legal immigrants as
well. And while he urges US citizens
to take a more democratic attitude
toward immigration, he is sympathetic toward those who have begun
to feel like strangers in their own
land.
The only shortcoming of Suro's
work is that he himself stops at the
border; that is, he does not address
the international dimensions of
immigration. This aspect is notably
absent from an otherwise comprehensive treatment of the issues. It
would be intriguing to hear what
Suro would say to our hemispheric
neighbors if his policy suggestions
with regard to illegal immigration
were implemented. U
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Latinos in the US
Marian Goslinga

L

fastest growing ethnic
group in the United
atinos constitute the
States. Separated by
regional differences yet
united by a common
cultural heritage, they are a force to
be reckoned with in US society.
Their influence is felt in politics,
economics, literature, education,
science, art, sports and just about
every other sphere of activities.
Due to Latino pressure and lobbying, for instance, bilingualism has
become an important educational
as well as political issue which can
no longer be relegated to the background.
Many US metropolitan areas have
a distinctly Latino flavor. Los
Angeles alone is home to fully onefifth of the nation's Latino population. Other cities with sizeable
Latino communities include Miami,
with its high percentage of Cubans;
New York, which has attracted many
Dominicans, Puerto Ricans and
other Caribbean Hispanics; and
Chicago, a steady magnet for
Mexicans. Texas cities such as
Houston, Dallas and San Antonio
are also known for their large
Mexican-American populations.
Although the Latino "umbrella"
embraces all these peoples, for reasons of space, the ensuing bibliography will list only those materials
(books and periodical articles)
which deal with Latinos as a group.
The titles below are a sample of the
many works published recently on
Latinos in all walks of life.

Bayless, Skip. Beisbol Fever: While
African-Americans Are Giving
Baseball the Cold Shoulder, Latinos
Are Embracing the Sport in Historic
Numbers. Sport vol. 89, no. 4 (April
1998): 30-36. [Mentions that the
percentage of Latino ballplayers in
Major League Baseball increased

from 14% in 1991 to 24% in 1997.]
Becket, Diane R. Increasing the
Number of Latino and Navajo
Teachers in Hard-to-staff Schools.
Journalof Teacher Educationvol. 49,
no. 3 (May-June 1998): 196-206.
[Discusses the Latino Teachers
Project at the University of Southern
California and the Navajo Nation
Teacher Preparation Program at Fort
Lewis College in Colorado.]
Blank, Susan and Ramon S.
Torrecilha. Understanding the
Living Arrangements of Latino
Immigrants: A Life Course
Approach. InternationalMigration
Review vol. 32, no. 1 (Spring 1998):

13-17.
Bloom, Harold, ed. Hispanic
American Writers. Philadelphia:
Chelsea House, 1998. 230 pp.
Bonilla, Frank et al., eds. Borderless
Borders: U.S. Latinos, Latin
Americans, and the Politics of
Independence. Philadelphia:
Temple University Press, 1998.
Cardoza Orlandi, Carlos F. Now You
See It, Now You Don't: Mission and
Ecumenism in a Hispanic/ Latino
Perspective. Theology Today vol. 54,

no. 4 (January 1998): 499-507.
Marian Goslinga is the Latin American
and Caribbeanlibrarianat Florida
InternationalUniversity.
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[Discusses Hispanic/Latino Christianity as an alternate faith different from
Latin American theology.]

Conde, Carlos. Republicans on the
Mend: The GOP Tries to Regain the
Support of Latino Voters. Hispanic
vol. 11, no. 5 (May 1998): 36-41.
Congressional Quarterly Weekly
Report. Ketchup to Salsa: Election
Hinges on Changes in Orange County, California. CongressionalQuarterly
Weekly Report vol. 56, no. 21 (May 23,
1998): 1371-1375. [In seeking a rerun of his race against incumbent
Democrat Loretta Sinchez, former
Rep. Robert K. Dornan appeals to
California's Latino community.]
Cortina, Rodolfo, ed. Hispanic
American Literature: An Anthology.
Lincolnwood, IL: NTC, 1998. 414 pp.
Darder, Antonia and Rodolfo D.
Torres, eds. The Latino Studies
Reader: Culture, Economy, and
Society. Malden, MA: Blackwell,

1998. 308 pp.
Davidow, Joie and Esmeralda
Santiago, eds. Las Christmas:
Favorite Latino Authors Share Their
Holiday Memories. New York:

Knopf, 1998.
Delgado, Melvin, ed. Alcohol
Use/Abuse among Latinos: Issues
and Examples of Culturally
Competent Services. New York:
Haworth Press, 1998. 208 pp.
Delgado, Melvin. Social Services in
Latino Communities: Research and
Strategies. New York: Haworth Press,

1998. 153 pp.
Delgado, Richard and Jean Stefancic,
eds. The Latino/a Condition: A
Critical Reader. New York: New
York University Press, 1998. 715 pp.
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Diaz, Rafael M. Latino Gay Men and
HIV: Culture, Sexuality, and Risk
Behavior. New York: Routledge,

Tinajero, eds. Educating Latino
Students: A Guide to Successful
Practice. Lancaster, PA: Technomic,

in Hispanic children and approaches
to speech therapy.]

1998. 192 pp.

1998. 383 pp.

Dominguez, Robert. Hispanics on
Broadway. Hispanicvol. 11, no. 1-2
(January 1998): 80-91.

Gonzalez, Ray, ed. Touching the
Fire: Fifteen Poets of Today's Latino
Renaissance. New York: Anchor
Books/Doubleday, 1998. 304 pp.

L6pez, Jack. Cholos & Surfers: A
Latino Family Album. Santa
Barbara, CA: Capra Press, 1998.

Falc6n, Rafael and Christine Yoder
Falc6n. Salsa: A Taste of Hispanic
Culture. Westport, CT.: Praeger,

1998.
Falicov, Celia Jaes. Latino Families in
Therapy: A Guide to Multicultural
Practice. New York: Guilford Press,

1998.
Flores, John. Uno, dos, tres ...
Hike!: Latinos in the National
Football League. Hispanicvol. 11, no.
1-2 (January-February 1998): 30-34.
[Traces the history of the NFL starting in 1929, when Jesse and Kelly
Rodriguez became the first Latinos
to play pro football. Includes a listing of Latinos in the NFL.]
Flores, Lauro, ed. The Floating
Borderlands: Twenty-five Years of
U.S. Hispanic Literature. Seattle:
University of Washington Press, 1998.
Gandara, Patricia and Elias L6pez.
Latino Students and College
Entrance Exams: How Much Do
They Really Matter? HispanicJournal
of Behavioral Sciences vol. 20, no. 1
(February 1998): 17-22.
Gonzales, Doreen. Gloria Estefan:
Singer and Entertainer. Springfield,

NJ: Enslow, 1998. 128 pp.
Gonzilez, Maria Luisa, Ana HuertaMacias, and Josefina Villamil

Guerena, Salvador and Vivian M.
Pisano, eds. Latino Periodicals: A
Selection Guide. Jefferson, NC:
McFarland, 1998.
Hornor, Louise L., ed. Hispanic
Americans: A Statistical Sourcebook.
Rev. ed. Palo Alto, CA: Information
Publications, 1998. 260 pp.
[Includes sections on demographics,
social characteristics, household and
family data, education, government
and elections, employment and
unemployment, income, crime and
special topics.]
Job, Juan Roberto. Just Because I'm
Latin Doesn't Mean I Mambo: A
Success Guide for Hispanic
Americans. New York: Ballantine,

1998. 241 pp.
Jones-Correa, Michael. Between
Two Nations: The Political
Predicament of Latinos in New York
City. Ithaca, NY Cornell University
Press, 1998. 246 pp.
Kanellos, Nicolis. Thirty Million
Strong: Reclaiming the Hispanic
Image in American Culture. Golden,
CO: Fulcrum, 1998. 166 pp.
Kayser, Hortense. Assessment and
Intervention Resources for Hispanic
Children. San Diego: Singular,
1998. [Discusses language disorders

Loya, Gloria Ines. Considering the
Sources/Fuentes for a Hispanic
Feminist Theology. Theology Today
vol. 54, no. 4 (January 1998): 491499. [Hispanic feminist theology,
also known as "Mujerista theology,"
takes as its inspiration the writings
of Dolores Huerta, a US Hispanic/
Latina activist; the tragic Mexican
figure Malintzin/La Malinche; Our
Lady of Guadalupe; and the seventeenth-century poet-theologianfeminist Sor Juana Ines de la Cruz.]
Maharidge, Dale. The Sleeping
Giant Awakes: The Latino Vote Is
Coming to an Election Near You,
and Neither Party Is Ready for It.
MotherJones vol. 23, no. 1 (JanuaryFebruary 1998): 56-62.
McClain, Paula D. and Steven C.
Tauber. Black and Latino
Socioeconomic and Political
Competition: Has a Decade Made a
Difference? American Politics Quarterly
vol. 26, no. 2 (April 1998): 237-253.
[Comparing data for 1990 and 1980,
the authors conclude that although
socioeconomic competition between
blacks and Latinos still exists, the
intensity of the relationship has
diminished. In politics, competition
between these two groups may be
displaced by increasing competition
between whites and Latinos.]
Miranda, Alexis O. and Debra L.
Umhoefer. Acculturation, Language
Use, and Demographic Variables as
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Predictors of the Career SelfEfficacy of Latino Career Counseling
Clients. Journalof MultiuIltural
Counseling and Development vol. 26,
no. 1 (January 1998): 39-63.

Assimilation on the Importance of

Mirriam-Goldberg, Caryn. Sandra
Cisneros: Latina Writer and Activist.
Springfield, NJ: Enslow, 1998.

Sosa, Lionel. The Americano

Novas, Himilce. Everything You
Need to Know about Latino History.
Rev. ed. New York: Plume, 1998.
Perez, Miguel A., et al. Northern
California Hispanic Migrant Farm
Workers' Health Status: A Case
Study. Migration World Magazine vol.

26, nos. 1/2: 17-23.

Family-related and Nature-related
Recreation among Hispanic
Americans. Journal of Leisure Research

vol. 30, no.

1 (Winter 1998): 47-64.

Dream: How Latinos Can Achieve
Success in Business and in Life. New
York: E.P. Dutton, 1998. 220 pp.
[Translated into Spanish under the
title: El sueno americano: Como los

latinos pueden triunfar en Estados
Unidos.]
Suro, Roberto. Strangers Among Us:
How Latino Immigration Is
Transforming America. New York:
Knopf, 1998. 349 pp. [Reviewed in
this issue.]

Platt, Lyman D. Census Records for
Latin America and the Hispanic
United States. Baltimore:
Genealogical Publishing. Co., 1998.

US Department of Education. No
More Excuses: Final Report of the

198 pp.
Ponce, Mary Helen. Latino Sleuths:
Hispanic Mystery Writers Make
Crime Pay. Hispanic vol. 11, no. 5
(May 1998): 44-48.
Riebe-Estrella, Gary. Latino
Religiosity or Latino Catholicism?
Theology Today vol. 54, no. 4 (January
1998): 512-516.
Rios-Bustamante, Antonio Jose and

Christine Marin. Latinos in
Museums: A Heritage Reclaimed.
Malabar, FL: Krieger, 1998. 142 pp.
Rodriguez, Roberto. Scholars Say
1Basta! to Chicano/Latino President
Shortage. Black Issues in Higher
Education vol. 15, no. 7 (May 28,
1998): 24-56.
Salas, Abel. Chartbusters: Twentyfive Top Latino Music Makers.
Hispanic vol. 11, no. 3 (March 1998):
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Orlando Centroplex
November 10, 11, 12, 1998
Orlando, Florida
IMPORT, EXPORT AND INTERNET SHOWCASE
International trade is the dominant force in the global economy, but the complexity of doing business overseas requires constant upgrading of
skills, information and contacts. The 1998 Intemational Exporters / Importers Conference is specifically geared towards helping you meet those
requirements and helping you build your domestic and international business. World class speakers from the private and public sectors will provide the information and contacts you need to make your business more competitive and profitable.
On-site appointments will be facilitated with exhibiting and visiting buyers, vendors, distributors, potential joint venture partners, investors and

other attendees who meet your interests and requirements. Complete turnkey exhibit packages are available for new-to-market companies
interested in taking their first step in the global marketplace.
The Peoples Republic of China has committed to participate, as have Ecuador, the Dominican Republic, Italy, Malaysia, Mexico, Poland, the
Russian Federation, Slovenia, Tunisia, Turkey and several Caribbean Countries.

Mail or fax this form with a copy of your business card to the address below:

Name

Please send me details about:

Title

Q Becoming a co-sponsor

Company

Q Exhibiting our product line

Address

Q Attending the conference and seminars
Q Advertising in the show program

Zip

City / State

Q Speaking at one of the seminars

Country

Q Hosting an event

Fax

Phone

PLEASE MAIL OR FAX REQUEST TO:
EXPORTERS-IMPORTERS CONFERENCE

242 South Militaryi Trail
C

Deerfield Beach, Florida 33442
Phone: (954) 427-9717 " Fax: (954) 427-9178

Q Holding a reception
Q Hosting a hospitality suite
l atcptn nacutyPvlo
L Participating in a country Pavilion
Q The Catalog showcase

Co - Sponsored by:

The Exporter Newspaper

Master of Arts in
Latin American and
Y kCaribbean Studies

LdCC

LATIN AMERICAN AND
CARIBBEAN CENTER

Florida International University
Miami, Florida
Cuna Indian, San Bas Islands, Panama

THE PROGRAM
The Master of Arts in Latin American and Caribbean Studies is a program which responds to the diversity of
disciplinary and subdisciplinary approaches to the study of Latin America and the Caribbean. The program
prepares students for doctoral-level studies in academic disciplines and for careers in the public and private
sectors. Full-time students can expect to complete the program, including thesis, in 18-24 months.
DEGREE REQUIREMENTS
The program consists of 36 hours of course work, including a thesis and specialization in a discipline to be
selected from the program's core departments (Economics, History, Environmental Studies, International
Relations, Modern Languages, Political Science, and Sociology/Anthropology). Students work under the
guidance of social science faculty whose expertise includes diverse themes such as the illicit narcotics trade,
the environment and sustainable development, migration, commerce and trade. Subregional strengths
include the Andes, Brazil and the Southern Cone, Mexico, Cuba and the Caribbean. Financial assistance is
available on a competitive basis.

FOR MORE INFORMATION, CONTACT
Eduardo A. Gamarra, Graduate Program Director
Latin American and Caribbean Center
Florida International University
University Park, DM 353, Miami, Florida 33199
Telephone: (305) 348-2894, Fax: (305) 348-3593

E-mail: gamarrae@fiu.edu

